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Inefficiencies in Networked Markets†
By Matthew Elliott*
In many markets, relationship specific investments are necessary 
for trade. These formed relationships constitute a networked market 
in which not all buyers can trade with all sellers. We show that 
networked markets can be decomposed to identify how alternative 
trading opportunities affect who trades with whom and at what price. 
This uncovers agents’ incentives to invest in relationships. Investment 
inefficiencies can eliminate all the gains from trade, but for reasons 
that differ depending on how investments are made. Three applications 
are considered in detail: high-skill labor markets, merger markets 
when industries are consolidating, and the international market for 
natural gas. (JEL C78, D85, D86)
In many markets a buyer and a seller must make a relationship-specific investment before they can trade: Countries invest in pipelines to trade oil and natural gas; 
contractors learn the specific requirements of manufacturers;1 acquirers pay due 
diligence costs, while takeover targets reveal private information; there are inter-
views prior to recruitment; art dealers authenticate paintings; illegal-goods handlers 
risk transacting with under-cover law enforcers; etc. After these investments have 
been made, only some buyer–seller pairs can trade with each other—the market is 
networked. This paper analyzes inefficiencies in these investments when long-term 
contracts cannot be enforced.
To analyze inefficiencies in the investments that enable trade it is necessary to 
first understand how the structure of a formed networked market affects bargained 
outcomes, who trades with whom, and at what prices. Letting the buyers and sellers 
be the nodes, links in a network can be used to represent which buyer–seller pairs 
have made the required investments to trade with each other. We consider bargaining 
outcomes in which no two linked agents have a profitable pairwise deviation. By 
utilizing and extending results from the matching literature, an intuitive algorithm is 
constructed that decomposes any network to identify: (i) the role of each link in the 
1 An example is the Japanese engineering and electronics industry (Nishiguchi 1994). 
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network—whether it is used for trade or to generate an outside option and affect the 
terms of trade; and (ii) the effect of each link on each agent’s bargained outcome. 
This network decomposition clarifies agents’ investment incentives and underlies 
the subsequent analysis of investment inefficiencies.
Relationship-specific investments are subject to well-understood inefficiencies. 
An agent may fail to make an efficient up-front investment, anticipating that he will 
be held up and unable to recover his costs. This problem can lead to underinvest-
ment. An agent may also make costly investments into alternative trading relation-
ships just to improve his terms of trade. This overinvestment generates no additional 
gains from trade and is also inefficient. We provide a systematic treatment of these 
inefficiencies when investments are made to enable trade in a market context. Which 
agents will make the required investments to trade? Who will actually trade with 
whom? How large will inefficiencies be? Which types of inefficiency will be most 
severe and when?
We consider two investment protocols. In protocol A, both the buyer and seller 
must make fixed, separate investments before they can trade, and we show that for 
this protocol the inefficiency problem of most concern is the hold-up problem. For 
any parametrization of the model, we characterize a tight bound on overinvestment 
inefficiency as buyers’ and sellers’ gains from trade are varied. For different param-
eter values, this bound ranges between 0 and 50 percent of the potential gains from 
trade. Underinvestment inefficiency, in contrast, may consume all the gains from 
trade. In protocol B, the investment costs necessary for forming a relationship are 
transferable and can be split in any way between the buyer and seller. For this pro-
tocol we show that shares of the investment costs can always be found to overcome 
the hold-up problem—the investment share of the agent at risk of being held up can 
be reduced until participation is profitable. Are the relationships that are formed 
then efficient, or close to efficient? While it is easier to form links that will be used 
for trade when investments are negotiated, it is also easier to form links to establish 
outside options that will not be used for trade. Although protocol B overcomes the 
hold-up problem, it exacerbates the overinvestment problem. With negotiated joint 
investments, overinvestment can consume all the gains from trade.
Both investment protocols seem important in practice. In some markets the rela-
tionship-specific investments that enable trade are naturally separate and nonsub-
stitutable, while in others the share of investments each agent is responsible for 
is negotiated. We examine three applications in detail. In high-skill labor markets, 
interviews are required before a firm can employ a worker. Investments into inter-
views are nonsubstitutable, and we argue that protocol A applies. Moreover, we 
make the case that firms have higher bargaining power and pay the majority of the 
interview costs. For this parameterization of the model, the scope for underinvest-
ment is limited (although the losses can be large when it occurs) and the magnitude 
of overinvestment inefficiency is bounded fairly tightly. A second application we 
consider is industry consolidation, where due diligence must be completed before 
credible offers can be made. The widespread use of termination fees2 provides a 
2 These are lump-sum transfers made from the target to a potential acquirer following a failed bid. 
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mechanism through which transfers are made, and means that protocol B fits this 
application  better. In the context of the model, we examine the omnicare, Inc. v. ncs 
Healthcare, Inc. decision that ruled against the use of an exclusive-dealing agree-
ment. We argue that by expanding the contracting space such agreements can help 
overinvestment be avoided. The final application we consider is the international 
market for natural gas, where pipelines must be constructed before trade is possible. 
We again argue that protcol B fits and identify possible instances of overinvestment.
This paper contributes primarily to the growing literatures on trade within, and 
the formation of, networked markets. The cooperative game theoretic approach we 
take to modeling trade builds on the matching literature and is most closely related 
to Kranton and Minehart (2000a).3 The main contribution to this literature is the 
network decomposition algorithm, which identifies how different trading opportu-
nities affect market outcomes. Our cooperative approach yields the same solution 
Corominas-Bosch (2004) finds in her noncooperative bargaining model.4 However, 
the Corominas-Bosch approach is only applied to environments with homogeneous 
gains from trade—and cannot be readily extended to environments with heteroge-
neous gains from trade. Experimental evidence supports her theory and, by exten-
sion, our theory (Charness, Corominas-Bosch, and Fréchette 2007).
A key feature of the bargaining approach we take is that players have endogenous 
disagreement payoffs or “outside options,’’ and these depend on the network struc-
ture. A related and complementary literature modeling input markets endogenizes 
disagreement payoffs in a different way. Building on the foundations laid in Horn and 
Wolinsky (1988), Iozzi and Valletti (2014) consider a supplier who simultaneously 
bargains bilaterally with multiple downstream producers over input prices. Suppose 
competition downstream is in quantities. If an agreement is not reached with a pro-
ducer, the supplier may be able to switch some additional supply to their other pro-
ducers at the agreed-upon price, as these producers will now demand more. When 
this is possible, the supplier’s outside option is better and they negotiate a higher 
input price. In contrast, we turn off potential product market effects by assuming that 
the surplus a buyer and seller generate does not depend on the trades of other buy-
er-seller pairs. This allows us to consider general networked markets, with multiple 
suppliers and multiple producers, permitting an analysis of the network formation 
problem. How substantial product market effects can be depends on how competitive 
the product market is and how much producers rely on a single supplier.5
There is a large literature on inefficient investment due to hold-up problems 
and overinvestment in outside options.6 Unlike much of this literature, we analyze 
investments in a market context with multiple buyers and multiple sellers, and where 
3 Nava (2015) models quantity competition in networked markets and Blume et al. (2009) model trade through 
intermediaries that quote bid and ask prices, while Fainmesser (2010) and Fainmesser and Goldberg (2011) study 
repeated trade over networks. 
4 Polanski (2007); Gale and Kariv (2007); Abreu and Manea (2012b, 2012a); Manea (2011); and Elliott and 
Nava (2014) also model noncooperative bargaining games over networks. 
5 Lee and Fong (2013) have an interesting recent paper that builds a dynamic model with general externalities 
between buyers and sellers. While the cost of this generality is the loss of analytical tractability, the paper helps 
draw out differences between a static and dynamic approach. In Section VID, we argue that some markets are likely 
to be well approximated by static models, while others will be better suited to a dynamic treatment. 
6 See Segal (1999) for a general treatment of inefficiencies that arise when one principal contracts with many 
agents in the presence of externalities. 
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investments enable trade. In Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a, b), investments 
are made in attributes valued by multiple potential trade partners, albeit at possibly 
different rates, and conditions are found under which investments are efficient. Felli 
and Roberts (2002) consider investments in quality where buyers and sellers are 
vertically differentiated. In both cases it is critical for the results that investments 
be valuable to multiple potential trade partners. Investments that enable trade are 
modeled by Kranton and Minehart (2001), (2000b). We generalize the Kranton and 
Minehart environment by permitting two-sided investments in links, heterogeneous 
potential gains from trade and a more general bargaining solution.
Kranton and Minehart (2001, 2000b), like Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 
(2001a, b) and Felli and Roberts (2002), focus on finding conditions under which 
efficient investments are made. We take a different approach by identifying differ-
ent types of inefficiency and measuring the efficiency losses due to them. This is 
complicated by the presence of multiple stable networks. Even for given gains from 
trade in a very small market with 5 buyers and 5 sellers, just finding the set of sta-
ble networks is hard—there are over 30 million possible (bipartite) networks to 
consider.7 We make some progress with these questions by importing two concepts 
from the computer science literature: the cost of anarchy and the price of anarchy, 
which measure the efficiency loss in the best and worst stable networks, respec-
tively (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 2009; Roughgarden and Tardos 2004). When 
bounding inefficiency losses from above, we focus on the worst stable network; and 
when bounding inefficiency losses from below, we focus on the best stable network. 
Despite taking this conservative approach, we find tight upper and lower bounds on 
different types of inefficiency that vary with the investment protocol. These results 
contrast with the positive efficiency results from the existing literature. We also 
depart from the existing literature by allowing investments to be negotiated.8
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a simple example illustrating 
the main points of the paper. Section II then sets up the model, and Section III 
analyzes bargaining over a formed network. Section IV identifies the efficient net-
work(s), providing a useful benchmark for the set of stable networks that are con-
sidered in Section V. Section V examines the inefficiency present in stable networks. 
Section VI discusses three applications of the model, and Section VII concludes.
I. Example
This section presents a very simple example to illustrate the inefficiency results. 
Suppose that there are two sellers,  s 1 and  s 2 , and a single buyer  b 1 . Each seller has 
a single unit to sell and the buyer demands one unit. To enable trade between either 
seller and  b 1 , a specific investment must be made at cost  c =  1 _2 − ε , where  ε is 
small and positive. Neither seller directly values the good they sell, and  b 1 values 
7 The relevant set of networks are bipartite, as buyers can trade only with sellers. For  m buyers and  n sellers, 
there are  2 mn such networks. 
8 Currarini and Morelli (2000) consider a noncooperative network formation game in which players form links 
and propose surplus splits, thereby endogenizing these splits. They find that the efficient network is stable under 
their condition of “size monotonicity.” 
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the good from  s 1 at  1 and the good from  s 2 at  1 − ε . Figure 1, panel A shows the 
potential gains from trade.
The efficient network maximizes the net gains from trade (the realized gains from 
trade less resources spent on forming links) and is shown in Figure 1, panel B. 
The net gains from trade generated by this network are  1 −  ( 1 _2 − ε) =  1 _2 + ε .
We first consider investment protocol A and suppose a buyer must pay  γc toward 
forming a link, while a seller must pay  (1 − γ)c , where  γ ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenous 
parameter. Let the sellers have all the bargaining power and make take-it-or-leave-it 
offers after a network is formed. If the efficient network were formed  b 1 would have 
no alternative but to trade with  s 1 , and  s 1 would sell to  b 1 at a price of  1 , extracting 
all the surplus and leaving  b 1 with a net payoff of  −γc . Anticipating this,  b 1 will not 
invest in a single link to  s 1 for fear of being held up. The complete network is not 
stable either. Sellers  s 1 and  s 2 will compete with each other to supply  b 1 , driving the 
price down until at least one of them is unable to recover their (sunk) investment. 
The empty network is the unique stable network. Underinvestment inefficiency due 
to a hold-up problem consumes all the possible gains from trade.
Consider instead protocol B, and let the buyer and sellers negotiate their invest-
ment shares. These negotiations are bilateral, and contingent contracts cannot be 
written. The empty network is no longer stable:  b 1 and  s 1 could agree to split the cost 
c so that  s 1 paid the entire cost, leaving  b 1 ’s payoff unaffected, but strictly increasing 
s 1 ’s payoff. However, the efficient network is not stable either. If the efficient net-
work were formed  s 1 would extract all the rents and  b 1 would receive a payoff of at 
most zero . Buyer  b 1 would then be willing to pay the entire investment cost required 
to form a link to  s 2 . With this additional link,  s 1 and  s 2 would compete to supply  b 1 , 
and  b 1 would extract rents  1 − ε less his investment costs. With negotiation, the 
unique stable network is the complete network, with  b 1 paying all the investment 
costs of forming the link to  s 2 and at least  c − ε of the investment costs of forming 
the link with  s 1 .
Under protocol A, the unique stable network is the empty network, and all gains 
from trade are lost to underinvestment. Under protocol B, there is no longer any 
underinvestment. However, underinvestment inefficiency is replaced by overinvest-
ment inefficiency. Buyer  b 1 forms a link to  s 2 for the sole purpose of improving his 
terms of trade with  s 1 . From an efficiency perspective, this investment generates no 
1
b1
1 − ε
Panel A. Potential links
1
Panel B. Efficient network
1 1 − ε
Panel C. Complete network
s1
b1 b1
s2 s1 s2 s1 s2
Figure 1. Networked Market
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gains from trade and is a waste of resources. Furthermore, as  ε → 0 overinvestment 
inefficiency consumes all the possible gains from trade.
II. Model
There is a set of  m buyers denoted  P and a set of  n sellers denoted  Q . The value of 
trade between a buyer  i and a seller  j is given by  a i j ≥ 0 . Each buyer demands one 
unit of the good, and each seller supplies one unit of the good. The  m × n dimen-
sional matrix  a describes the value of all potential bilateral trades.
There are two stages. In stage one, buyers and sellers make relationship-specific 
investments to enable trade, where the gains from trade  a are common knowledge. 
The resulting set of potential trading relationships is  L = { l i j } . As  n and  m are fixed, 
the network  (n, m, L) depends only on  L and abusing notation we will refer to  L as a 
network. A link is formed enabling trade between  i and  j ( l i j ∈ L ) if and only if their 
joint investment is at least  c ; otherwise no link is formed ( l i j ∉ L ). Two investment 
protocols are considered. In protocol A, buyers and sellers choose whether or not 
to pay an exogenously fixed proportion of the cost  c :  γ and  1 − γ , respectively. In 
protocol B, buyers and sellers negotiate over how the cost  c is split between them, so 
that a link is formed whenever they jointly benefit from it. It is assumed that future 
terms of trade are noncontractible.9
In stage two, buyers and sellers bargain over the network. The trades imple-
mented are described by an  m × n matrix  x , where element  x i j indicates that buyer 
i purchases  x ij ∈ [0, 1] units from seller  j . All rows and all columns of  x must sum 
to no more than  1 , as each buyer demands only a single unit and each seller supplies 
only a single unit.10
For  x i j > 0 , the price buyer  i pays seller  j per unit is  p i j . Bargaining solutions 
that map the potential gains from trade  a and network  L into trades  x(a, L) and 
prices  p(a, L) will be considered. Buyer  i ’s payoff is denoted by  u i (a, L) :  핉 + m×n ×  2 m×n →  핉 + , and seller  j ’s payoff by  v j (a, L) :  ℝ + m×n ×  2 m×n →  ℝ + . The utilities 
of buyer  i and seller  j are the surpluses they extract from each of their transactions:11
  u i =  ∑ 
k∈Q
 x ik ( a ik −  p ik )               v j =  ∑ 
k∈P
x k j  p k j . 
The symmetry of buyers and sellers means that for all the results found for buy-
ers, there are symmetric results for sellers. Some results will be stated for just buyers 
or just sellers.
9 This assumption is discussed in Section VID. 
10 While it is possible for  i to purchase  x ij ∈ (0, 1) of a unit from seller  j and  x ik of a unit from another seller  k , 
it will turn out that endogenously  x ij ∈ {0, 1} . 
11 Without loss of generality, sellers’ values from keeping their goods are normalized to  zero , and buyers’ values 
of goods are adjusted to reflect the net gains from trade. 
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III. Bargaining over a Formed Network
To analyze network formation, a backward induction approach will be applied and 
trade over a given network considered first. This section proposes a mapping from 
the formed network ( L ) and potential gains from trade ( a ) into outcomes (quantities 
traded by different pairs and prices) and identifies how the network structure affects 
these outcomes.
A bargaining outcome is a triple ( x, u, v ). Bargaining outcomes are considered 
that satisfy pairwise stability. An outcome ( x, u, v ) is stable if payoffs are individu-
ally rational ( u i ≥ 0 ,  v j ≥ 0 for all  i, j ) and no buyer and seller could both increase 
their payoffs by trading with each other and splitting the resulting gains from trade in 
any way: for all  i,  j ,  u i +  v j ≥  a ij if  l i j ∈ L . The set of stable outcomes is denoted 
by  Ω .12
Let the matrix  α , with elements  α i j ≔  a i j l i j , summarize the values of feasible 
trades after investments have been made. Unlinked buyer–seller pairs then generate 
no surplus if they match, and will do equally well by remaining unmatched. The 
bargaining over a network problem with potential gains from trade  a and possible 
trades given by the network  L is then a matching with transferable utility (assign-
ment) problem with gains from trade  α .
A match  μ is a function from the set of all buyers and sellers into itself, 
μ: P ∪ Q → P ∪ Q , such that (i) each buyer (seller) is matched to a seller (buyer) 
or himself (herself), and (ii) buyer  i is matched to seller  j if and only if seller  j is 
matched to buyer  i .13 Although in principle a buyer can multihome and buy from 
multiple sellers, such outcomes are typically unstable. Generically,14 the quantity 
traded  x ij is an element of  {0, 1} in all stable outcomes. This follows from the lin-
earity in the utility functions. It is then without loss of generality that bargaining 
outcomes consisting of the triple ( μ, u, v ) are considered. Denote the set of all pos-
sible matches  M . Where there should be no confusion, notation will be abused and 
arguments dropped.
There is a generically unique match  μ ∗ (·; α) that maximizes the gains from trade:
(1)  μ ∗ (·; α) ≔  arg max μ∈M 
   { ∑ i∈Pα iμ(i ) } .
Shapley and Shubik (1972) show that the set of stable outcomes (matches and 
payoffs) has many nice properties.15 First, we know that there exist payoffs for 
which a match is stable if and only if that match maximizes the total surplus. This 
implies that there is a (generically) unique pairwise stable match. Second, when 
12 An alternative approach would be to require bargaining outcomes to satisfy the Shapley value (Myerson 
1977). However, in this environment, the Shapley value is not always stable (consider, for example, the network 
shown in Figure 2). 
13 Formally:  μ(i; α) ∈ Q ∪ i ;  μ( j; α) ∈ P ∪ j ; and  μ(i; α) = j if and only if  μ( j; α) = i .
14 Let  ε i j be a noise term drawn independently from an atomless distribution with continuous support. If 
we take any gains from trade and perturb them by adding these noise terms, and so consider gains from trade 
 a ̂i j =  a ij +  ε i j , then with probability  1 ,  x ij ∈ {0, 1} for all  i, j in all stable outcomes. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990). 
15 We discuss and provide intuition for these results in Section OA-1 of the online Appendix. 
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there are multiple surplus-maximizing matches, the same payoffs support all such 
matches as a stable outcome. Third, each matched buyer and seller must split their 
gains from trade between themselves in a stable outcome:  u i +  v  μ ∗ (i) =  α ij . Fourth, 
even though we look only for outcomes robust to pairwise deviations, this also 
implies there are no profitable coalitional deviations—the set of stable outcomes 
coincides with the set of core outcomes. Finally, the set of stable payoffs forms a 
complete lattice for the partial ordering of buyers’ payoffs,16 where  u > u′ if and 
only if  u i >  u i ' for all  i ∈ P .17
It will be helpful to define the lowest and highest stable payoffs the agents can 
receive:
  
 u _i  
≔
 
 min ( μ, u, v)∈Ω  
  u i , 
          
 
 _ u i  
≔
 
 max ( μ, u, v)∈Ω    u i ,   v _i ≔  min (μ, u, v)∈Ω  
  v i ,            _ v i ≔  max (μ, u, v)∈Ω  
  v i .
We will refer to a buyer  i ’s lowest possible stable payoff ( u _i ) as his “outside 
option.’’ Seller  j ’s outside option  ( v _j ) is defined analogously. The lattice structure 
of the stable outcomes implies that the payoff vectors  ( u _,  _ v) and  ( _ u,  v _) are stable.
Figure 2 shows a simple formed network. On this network,  b 1 will be matched 
to seller  s 1 (otherwise  b 1 and  s 1 would have a profitable deviation). The worst-case 
scenario for  b 1 is to receive a payoff of  5 . If  b 1 received any worse terms of trade, 
he would have a profitable deviation by instead trading with  s 2 . Thus,  u _ b 1  = 5 and 
the set of stable outcomes are  u  b 1  = 5 + 5β ,  v  s 1  = 5(1 − β) and  v  s 2  = 0 for a 
parameter  β ∈ [0, 1] .
Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) identify an algorithm to find buyers’ and 
sellers’ minimum stable payoffs. However, not much is known about how the struc-
ture of the network  α affects payoffs. The network decomposition algorithm identi-
fies a simple way of decomposing any weighted network  α into a directed weighted 
network from which the effect of every link on each agent’s outside option can be 
easily found:18
•	 Identify	trade	partners.	Given	a	network	 α , find the match that maximizes the 
possible gains from trade. This match  ( μ ∗ (·; α)) defines each agent’s trade 
partner. Represent these relationships by directed solid links.
•	 Identify	 outside	 trade	 partners.	 To	 find	 an	 agent	 	k ’s outside trade part-
ner, remove his trade partner  μ ∗ (k) from the network and identify the agent 
he rematches to for the gains from trade to be maximized over the new net-
work.19 More formally, let  α / μ ∗ (k; α) be the gains from trade once player 
μ ∗ (k; α) is removed from the network so that  i and  j have gains from trade 
α ij if  i, j ≠  μ ∗ (k; α) , and  0 otherwise. Agent  k ’s outside trade partner is then 
16 The equivalent partial ordering for sellers’ payoffs could be used. 
17 More formally, suppose  (u, v) and  (u′, v′ ) are stable payoff vectors. Let  u ˆ = u ∨ u′, such that for all 
i ,  u ̂i =  max ( u i ,  u i ′ ) ; and let  v ̃ = v ∧ v′ , such that for all  j ,  v ̃j =  min ( v j ,  v j ′ ) . Define  u ̃ and  v ˆ analogously. The 
payoff vectors  ( u ˆ ,  v ̃ ) and  ( u ̃ ,  v ˆ ) must then also be stable. 
18 Generically, there is a unique network decomposition. When there are multiple directed network representa-
tions, any one can be selected and all results will carry through. 
19 If  k is unmatched,  k has no outside trade partner. 
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 η(k; α) ≔  μ ∗ (k; α / μ ∗ (k; α)) . Find all agents’ outside trade partners in this 
manner, and represent these relationships (outside option links) by directed 
dashed links from  k to  η(k) .
The network decomposition algorithm runs in polynomial time and can be pro-
grammed as the solution to  m + n + 1 linear programming problems. To see how 
the decomposition is implemented (by hand), consider the network in Figure 3, 
panel A. The links traded over are found first by considering the match that max-
imizes the gains from trade. These relationships are represented by directed solid 
links in Figure 3, panel B. For example,  b 1 must trade with  s 1 for the gains from 
trade to be maximized, and so  s 1 is  b 1 ’s trade partner. To find each agent’s outside 
trade partner, his trade partner is removed from the network and the match that max-
imizes the gains from trade on this reduced network is found. If  s 1 is removed from 
the network,  b 1 has to rematch to  s 2 for the gains from trade to be maximized, and 
so  b 1 ’s outside trade partner is  s 2 , as shown by the dashed directed link from  b 1 to 
s 2 . It is interesting that in this example the highest-value link does not feature in the 
decomposed network and so is redundant.
Agent  k ’s outside option chain is a sequence of links that can be easily identified 
from the network decomposition. Start at the node  k . Then alternately follow the 
directed dashed links and then directed solid links, until this is no longer possible. 
Let  L k dl denote the set of dashed links in  k ’s outside option chain, and  L k sl the set of 
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solid links in  k’ s outside option chain.20 The outside option chains for the network 
in Figure 3 are shown in Figure 5, panel A.
We now show how agents’ outside option chains determine the value of their 
outside options. Suppose  k ’s trade partner ( μ ∗ (k) ) is removed from the network. 
The gains from trade being generated by  k and  μ ∗ (k) ,  α k μ ∗ (k) , will then be lost, but 
a rematching may recover some of these losses. Lemma 1 shows that the optimal 
rematching, which maximizes the gains from trade generated on the network with-
out  μ ∗ (k) , occurs along  k ’s outside option chain:  k rematches to his outside trade 
partner  η (k) , which leaves  η (k) ’s trade partner unmatched, so he rematches to his 
outside trade partner, and so on. Whenever an agent is rematched in any optimal 
rematching, he rematches to the same person.
Denote the set of links that are no longer matched over in an optimal rematching 
following the removal of  μ ∗ (k) by  L  μ ∗ (k) − , and the set of links that are newly matched 
over by  L  μ ∗ (k) + , and recall that the links in  L k dl are the dashed links in  k ’s outside 
option chain, while the links in  L k sl are the solid links in  k ’s outside option chain.
LEMMA 1:
 (i) If an agent is removed from the network, every agent displaced as part 
of the subsequent optimal rematching is rematched to his outside trade 
partner—the same agent he would rematch to if his trade partner were 
directly removed from the network:
  L  μ ∗ (k) + =  L k dl    and      L  μ ∗ (k) − =  L k sl ∪  { l k μ ∗ (k) }      k ∈ P ∪ Q .
 (ii) outside option chains are always finite; they never cycle.
The Proof of Lemma 1 and subsequent proofs are in the Appendix, section B. To 
gain intuition for Lemma 1, consider the simple three-buyer and three-seller network 
shown in Figure 4. The dashed ovals represent the optimal match on this network. 
Now suppose that  s 1 is removed from the network and in the optimal rematching 
b 2 rematches to  s 3 , as shown in Figure 4. One implication of Lemma 1 is that  b 2 
must also rematch to  s 3 if  s 2 were removed from the network instead of  s 1 ; thus the 
rematching shown in Figure 4, panel C cannot be optimal.
To see why the rematchings in Figure 4 are inconsistent, note that the following 
two equations must hold:
(2)  α 11 +  α 22 +  α 33 >  α 12 +  α 21 +  α 33 , 
(3)  α 12 +  α 23 >  α 22 +  α 33 . 
20 Outside option chains, although defined and motivated in a different way, are similar to the opportunity paths 
identified by Kranton and Minehart (2000a) for networks with homogeneous gains from trade. Outside option 
chains can be viewed as a generalization of opportunity paths. However, there is no counterpart to Theorem 1 in 
Kranton and Minehart (2000a). In concurrent independent work, Caplin and Leahy (2014, 2010) have identified 
similar mathematical structures using a different methodology. 
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Equation 2 holds from the optimal match being the one shown in Figure 4, 
panel A; and Equation 3 holds from the optimal match shown in Figure 4, panel B. 
Summing these inequalities:
(4)  α 11 +  α 23 >  α 21 +  α 33 . 
It follows immediately that the rematching shown in Figure 4, panel C does not 
maximize the gains from trade and cannot be optimal. The Proof of Lemma 1 gen-
eralizes this intuition, showing that on any finite network no players rematch to 
anyone other than their outside trade partner. Lemma 1 provides the key step in 
proving Theorem 1, which shows how agents’ outside options can be found from the 
directed network decomposition.
THEOREM 1: Each agent’s outside option can be found by alternatively adding 
and then subtracting the values of the links in his outside option chain:
  u _i =  ∑ 
l∈ L i dl 
 α l −  ∑ 
l∈ L i sl 
 α l ,                  v _j =  ∑ 
l∈ L j dl 
 α l −  ∑ 
l∈ L j sl 
 α l . 
Whenever an agent’s trade partner ( μ ∗ (i) ) is removed from the network, by 
Lemma 1 the optimal rematching occurs along  i ’s outside option chain. The change 
in total surplus after  μ ∗ (i) is removed can be found by adding the new links matched 
over and subtracting the old links no longer matched over. This change in total sur-
plus is  μ ∗ (i) ’s marginal contribution to total surplus. Using a result from Démange 
(1982) and Leonard (1983), this is also  μ ∗ (i) ’s maximum possible pairwise stable 
payoff. As  i and  μ ∗ (i) must split the surplus they generate, and by the lattice struc-
ture of the pairwise stable payoffs,  α i μ ∗ (i) less  μ ∗ (i) ’s marginal contribution to total 
surplus is  i ’s outside option.
Outside option chains for the network given in Figure 3 are illustrated in Figure 5, 
panel A. Each agent’s outside option is then found by alternately adding and sub-
tracting the values of these links. For example,  b 1 ’s outside option chain consists 
of the sequence of links  { l  b 1 s 2  ,  l  b 2 s 2  ,  l  b 2 s 3  ,  l  b 3 s 3  } and so his outside option is given by 
 α  b 1 s 2  −  α  b 2 s 2  +  α  b 2 s 3  −  α  b 3 s 3  , as shown in Figure 5, panel B.
   
b1
Panel A. Formed network Panel B. Removing s1 Panel C. Removing s2
b2 b3 b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
s1 s2 s3 s1 s2 s3 s1 s2 s3
Figure 4. Inconsistent Optimal Rematchings which Violate Lemma 1
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There is a strong relationship between the outside trade partners identified in the 
network decomposition algorithm and players’ profitable pairwise deviations.21
COROLLARy 1: consider any stable outcome. suppose agent  k ’s terms of trade 
are now weakened to the extent that he receives a payoff below his outside option. 
Agent  k will then have a profitable deviation by trading with his outside trade part-
ner  η(k) .
Corollary 1 shows that it is the potential for an agent to trade with his outside 
trade partner that generates a binding constraint on his minimum possible stable 
payoff and establishes his outside option.
Stability implies that for all buyers  i ,  u i ∈  [ u _i ,  α i μ ∗ (i; α) −  v _ μ ∗ (i; α) ] , with anal-
ogous bounds on sellers’ payoffs.22 The value of the network decomposition and 
Theorem 1 is that it identifies how the structure of the network affects agents’ 
outside options and informs us about their incentives to invest in specific links. In 
the next section we will analyze these investment incentives and show that ineffi-
ciencies in investments can be large. Without any further restrictions on the map-
ping from formed networks to bargained outcomes, such a result would not be too 
 surprising—a mapping from formed networks to stable payoffs could be picked 
to create bad incentives to form links. To demonstrate the possibility of inefficien-
cies more forcefully, we will tie our hands and look at point predictions rather than 
set-valued predictions. Pairwise stability ensures that agents receive at least their 
outside option from a trade, but their investment incentives will depend crucially on 
how the remaining surplus is split. To capture this, we generalize the parametriza-
tion of stable outcomes found for the network in Figure 2.
Suppose that  i is matched to  j on the network  α :  μ ∗ (i; α) = j . Consider terms of 
trade in which  i and  j receive their outside options for sure, and then the remaining 
21 Recall that outside trade partners are identified by removing an agent’s trade partners from the network and 
seeing who he rematches to. If instead an agent’s link to his trade partner is removed from the network and the sub-
sequent rematching is used to identify outside trade partners, it is possible to construct examples in which an agent 
has an outside trade partner but can still receive a payoff of zero without having a profitable pairwise deviation. See 
Section OA-4 of the online Appendix. 
22 In the example of Figure 3, panel A,  u b1 ∈ [9, 10] ,  u b2 ∈ [4, 5] ,  u b3 ∈ [0, 1] ,  v s1 ∈ [0, 1] ,  v s2 ∈ [5, 6], and 
v s3 ∈ [9, 10] . 
10 15 10 14 10
Agent Outside option 
Panel A. Outside option chains Panel B. Outside options
b1 b2 b3
s1 s2 s3
b1
b2
b3
s1
s2
s3
15 – 10 + 14 – 10 = 9
14 – 10 = 4
0
0
15 – 10 = 5
14 – 10 + 15 – 10 = 9
Figure 5. Directed Network Decomposition
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gains from trade are split according to an exogenous parameter  β ∈ [0, 1] , which 
can be interpreted as buyers’ relative bargaining power:
(5)  u i =  u _i + β ( α ij −  u _i −  v _j ) , 
(6)  v j =  v _j + (1 − β) ( α ij −  u _i −  v _j ) . 
Focusing on these terms of trade, with an exogenously specified bargaining-power 
parameter, emphasizes the role of the network in providing outside options. In 
Corominas-Bosch (2004), players are selected at random and then make offers 
simultaneously to all of their possible trade partners. The terms of trade in equations 
(5)and (6) are the same as those found in Corominas-Bosch (2004), although she 
analyzes only environments with homogeneous gains from trade.23
As in all stable payoffs in which  i and  j are matched  u i +  v j =  α ij , we have 
that  
_ u i +  v _j =  u _i +  _ v j =  α ij . Equations (5) and (6) can therefore be rewritten as:
(7)  u i = β _ u i + (1 − β) u _i , 
(8)  v j = (1 − β) _ v j + β v _j . 
These payoffs are a convex combination of agents’ maximum and minimum pos-
sible stable payoffs. When  β = 1 , all buyers receive their maximum possible pay-
offs, while sellers receive their minimum possible payoffs; and when  β = 0 , all 
buyers receive their minimum possible payoffs, while sellers receive their maximum 
possible payoffs. At both these payoff vectors, no buyer  i and seller  j has a profitable 
pairwise deviation, so  
_ u i +  v _j ≥  α i j and  u _i +  _ v j ≥  α i j . It follows immediately 
that for any  β ∈ [0, 1] ,  β ( _ u i +  v _j ) + (1 − β) ( u _i +  _ v j ) ≥  α i j , so the payoffs from 
equations (5) and (6) are stable.24
With the above parametrization of agents’ payoffs, the network decomposition 
algorithm identifies who has incentives to form which links. It is straightforward to 
substitute the result from Theorem 1 into the agents’ payoff functions (equations (5) 
and (6)) to find how the value of each link affects each agent’s payoff at the mar-
gin. This will be very helpful when considering the network formation problem in 
Section V. For example, if a link would be redundant, there will be no incentives to 
invest in it; despite  l  b 1 s 3  being the highest-value link in Figure 3, panel A, neither  b 1 
nor  s 3 will be willing to invest in it if the other links are formed.
23 It is not straightforward to directly extend Corominas-Bosch’s model to include heterogeneous gains from 
trade. Indeed, she concludes that although it is “natural to ask for the introduction of a little bit of heterogeneity 
in the model [ … ] [w]e believe that this line of research is unlikely to lead to fruitful results.’’ Section OA-3 of the 
online Appendix shows the equivalence of the Corominas-Bosch (2004) outcomes and the terms of trade in equa-
tions 5 and 6. 
24 These terms of trade are generally only a subset of the stable terms of trade. Were individualized pairwise 
bargaining powers  β i j modeled, all pairwise outcomes would be included but also some nonstable outcomes. For a 
complete characterization of pairwise stable outcomes see Quint (1991). 
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IV. Efficiency Losses
Using the simple mapping from formed networked markets into bargaining out-
comes provided by combining Theorem 1 with equations  ( 5) and  ( 6), investment 
inefficiencies in the network formation stage will be analyzed. Ideally, statements 
would be made about how efficiency losses change with the potential gains from 
trade between different buyers and sellers, the relative bargaining power of buyers 
to that of sellers, and how the costs of forming links is split. However, a number of 
difficulties inhibit such statements. There are typically multiple stable networks, and 
so comparisons across sets of networks are required. Moreover, the set of stable net-
works does not have a simple mathematical structure that could facilitate set-based 
statements.25 And even when there is a unique stable network, efficiency losses 
can be nonmonotonic in the model’s parameters.26 Despite these problems, some 
progress will be possible by identifying upper and lower bounds on inefficiency that 
apply to all stable networks.
A. The Efficient network
The efficient network maximizes the net gains from trade  (nGT(L)) —the gains 
generated from trade less the costs of forming the links in  L :
(9)  L e ≔  max 
L∈ 
  nGT(L) =  max 
L∈ 
  { ∑ i∈P α i μ ∗ (i, α(L))  − c|L|} ,  
where  α ii = 0 for each buyer  i ∈ P ;  |L| is the cardinality of  L and so the number 
of links in network  L ; and  is the set of all possible bipartite networks.
B. Measuring Inefficiencies
The efficiency loss  EL(L) of a network  L will be measured as the percent-
age of the possible net gains from trade that are lost:  EL =  (nGT( L e ) − 
nGT(L)) / nGT( L e ) ∈ [0, 1] . There are then two subtleties to deal with. First, when 
the supremum of possible efficiency losses for all potential gains from trade is  1 , it 
will be said that the efficiency losses are  100  percent . Second, when there are mul-
tiple stable networks, a conservative approach will be taken, and only results that 
apply to all stable networks will be stated.27
25 More specifically, the set of stable networks does not form a complete lattice or semi-lattice when partially 
ordered by set inclusion of links, inhibiting comparisons that might otherwise be made in the strong set order. 
26 See Section OA-9 statics of the online Appendix. 
27 Equivalently, we use the “price of anarchy’’ and “cost of anarchy’’ (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 2009; 
Roughgarden and Tardos 2004), by considering the worst stable network when bounding the efficiency losses from 
above and the best stable network when bounding inefficiency losses from below. 
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C. Types of Inefficiency
overinvestment inefficiency  oII(L) on a network  L is the efficiency loss due to the 
formation of links that are not used for trade. Denoting the links in a network  L used 
for trade by  K ⊆ L , the efficiency loss due to overinvestment in non-trade links is28
(10)  oII(L) ≔   (|L| − |K|) c  _________________  
nGT(L) +  (|L| − |K|) c ∈ [0, 1]. 
Overinvestment inefficiency occurs when a link that is not used for trade is 
formed. An agent might want to form such a link to establish an outside option and 
affect his terms of trade with his trade partner.
underinvestment inefficiency ( uII(L) ) on a network  L is the efficiency loss due 
to forgone net gains from trade that could be realized by forming links between 
unmatched buyers and unmatched sellers.29 Consider a network  L , such that buyers 
P ̂ ⊆ P and sellers  Q ̂ ⊆ Q will end up unmatched in stable outcomes. For this sub-
set of buyers and sellers, denote the efficient network by  L ̂ e ≔  max  L ′ ∈ ˆ   nGT( L ′ ) , 
where   ˆ is the set of all possible bipartite networks between the buyers  P ̂ and sell-
ers  Q ̂ . Underinvestment inefficiency on  L is then30
(11)  uII(L) ≔  nGT ( L ̂
e )   _______________  
nGT(L) + nGT ( L ̂e ) ∈ [0, 1]. 
Underinvestment inefficiency can occur due to a hold-up problem. Unmatched 
buyers and sellers may have positive net gains from trade but remain unlinked on 
a stable network, anticipating that they will be held up once they have sunk their 
investment costs.31
V. Inefficiencies in Stable Networks
In this section, we compare stable (equilibrium) networks to the efficient network.
A. Protocol A
We first assume that cost shares are exogenous, so that buyers and sellers must 
make separate, nonsubstitutable investments to enable trade. For a link to be formed, 
the buyer must pay  γc , while the seller pays  (1 − γ)c , where  c > 0 and  γ ∈ [0, 1] .
The simultaneous link formation game is a simultaneous move game with com-
plete information. Buyers and sellers are the players. Each player chooses a subset 
28 All results go through, with the same proofs, if the denominator in equation 10 is changed to  nGT( L e ) . 
29 While it may also be possible to increase the net gains from trade by forming links involving either a matched 
buyer and/or a matched seller, this will necessarily result in a link currently matched over becoming redundant. 
Inefficiencies of this type are attributed to coordination problems. 
30 All results go through, with the same proofs, if the denominator in equation 11 is changed to  nGT( L e ) . 
31 There may be positive levels of inefficiency remaining once overinvestment and underinvestment inefficiency 
have been taken into account. This inefficiency can be attributed to coordination problems. 
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of the players on the other side of the market to attempt to form a link to. Buyers 
invest  γc in each link they select, while sellers invest  (1 − γ)c in each link they 
select. A buyer  i ∈ P therefore has a strategy set  {0, 1} n , while a seller  j ∈ Q has a 
strategy set  {0, 1} m . A link is formed if and only if a total investment of  c is made in 
it. Links therefore require investment from both the buyer and seller to be formed, 
except when  γ ∈ {0, 1} . Payoffs are players’ payoffs from trade on the formed net-
work less their investment costs.
If stable networks were defined to be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the 
simultaneous link formation game, there would be stable networks where a buyer 
and a seller fail to coordinate on forming a link that would benefit them both. 
Furthermore, the empty network would be stable for all  γ ∈ (0, 1) . To eliminate 
these types of networks from the set of stable networks, buyers and sellers will be 
allowed to coordinate on forming a link that benefits them both.
A network will be considered stable when it is pairwise Nash stable. A network 
L is pairwise nash stable32 if and only if it is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of 
the simultaneous link formation game and pairwise stable, so that no unformed link 
would benefit both the buyer and seller were it formed. Formally, pairwise stability 
requires that, for all  i, j , such that  l i j ∉ L , the following conditions hold:33
•	 If		 u i (L ∪  l i j ) − γc >  u i (L) , then  v j (L ∪  l i j ) − (1 − γ)c <  v j (L) .
•	 If		 v j (L ∪  l i j ) − (1 − γ)c >  v j  (L) , then  u i (L ∪  l ij ) − γc <  u i (L) .
Unlike pairwise stability alone, pairwise Nash stability ensures that agents’ “indi-
vidual rationality’’ constraints are met because agents always have the option of 
deleting all their links and receiving a payoff of  zero . Networks that are pairwise 
stable, but not a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous link formation game, can 
involve agents receiving negative payoffs without having a profitable deviation 
because the only deviations they are able to consider are those that delete or add 
one link at a time. Although stronger than pairwise stability, pairwise Nash stability 
is a relatively weak stability criterion. A network can be pairwise Nash stable even 
if a buyer and a seller could profit from forming a link between themselves while 
simultaneously deleting some other links. However, as discussed below, our results 
that use pairwise Nash stability are robust to other, stronger stability requirements.
PROPOSITION 1: under investment protocol A, the following hold:
 (i) For all gains from trade  a , all cost shares  γ ∈ (0, 1) , and all levels of buyer 
bargaining power  β ∈ [0, 1] , overinvestment inefficiency on all  stable 
32 Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced the concept of pairwise stability and suggested pairwise Nash 
stability as a refinement. 
33 For all potential gains from trade ( a ), for all levels of bargaining power ( β ) , and for cost shares  γ ∈ (0, 1) 
there exists a pairwise Nash stable network where all inefficiency can be attributed to underinvestment and overin-
vestment. This helps motivate the focus on underinvestment and overinvestment inefficiency rather than coordina-
tion problems. See Section OA-5 of the online Appendix. 
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 networks is bounded by a function  h(γ, β, m, n) ∈ [0%, 50%] , and this bound 
is tight.
 (ii) For all nonempty sets  P ,  Q of buyers and sellers, respectively, and all  β ≠ γ , 
there exist gains from trade  a with underinvestment inefficiency of 100 per-
cent on all stable networks.
Proposition 1 is proved in the Appendix, section B. The second part is proved 
by constructing an example in which there is a unique stable network that has  100 
percent efficiency loss for any  β ≠ γ and any  m, n ≥ 1 . The proof of the first part 
of Proposition 1 is more involved and relies heavily on the network decomposi-
tion algorithm. Without restricting the possible gains from trade  a , it is possible to 
place an upper bound (which is at most  50 percent ) on overinvestment inefficiency 
in the worst stable network. The upper bound of  50 percent is obtained only for 
β = γ =  1 _2. For all other parameter values, the overinvestment bound is tighter. 
Indeed, as all the bargaining power is concentrated at either the buyers ( β → 1 ) or 
the sellers ( β → 0 ), the upper bound on overinvestment inefficiency goes to  zero . 
To illustrate this, the function  h(γ, β, m, n) is shown for  m = n = 10 in Figure 6. 
There are similar bounds for other values of  m and  n .
To gain intuition for the efficiency bound in Figure 6, consider the incentives of 
a matched buyer and matched seller to form an outside option link with each other. 
For interior cost shares  (γ ∈ (0, 1)) , both the buyer and seller must invest in the 
outside option link for it to be formed. When the buyer’s bargaining power is high 
( β high), he has little incentive to make this investment; the buyer already receives 
most of the surplus an outside option would guarantee him. The outside option link 
will not be formed if the buyer has high bargaining power and has to pay at least 
some moderate cost toward forming the link. Similarly, the seller will not be willing 
to invest much in an outside option when his bargaining power is high ( β low). This 
explains why the inefficiency bound goes to  0 as  β → 0 and as  β → 1 .
We now provide some intuition for why the bound is never more than  50 percent . 
Consider a matched buyer–seller pair ( i, j ), where both the buyer  i and seller  j have 
no other links, and consider the maximum amount that  i and  j would each be willing 
to invest in an outside option. For  i and  j to still trade once they have invested in 
their outside options, the combined value of their outside options must be weakly 
less than their gains from trade ( α i j ). We will consider the overinvestment possible 
when both  i and  j invest in an outside option. Suppose then that both  i and  j have the 
opportunity to form an outside option link that will guarantee each of them half of 
the gains from trade. As between them  i and  j were already splitting the surplus, the 
creation of these two outside options can lead to a reallocation of at most half the 
surplus, and so overinvestment cannot exceed  50 percent .34
34 Buyer  i ’s payoff without his outside option is  β( α ij −  v _j ) , and his payoff with his outside option is 
 
 α i j  __2 + β ( α i j −  
 α ij  __2 −  v _j ) . Thus,  i is willing to pay at most  (1 − β) 
 α i j  __2 for his outside option  (an amount independent 
of  v _j ) . A similar calculation reveals that  j is willing to pay at most  β   α i j  __2 . Summing these amounts, overinvestment 
can be at most  
 α ij  __2 . 
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Stability concepts can be categorized by the deviations that they permit. Pairwise 
Nash stability permits two types of deviations we view as desirable: (i) An agent 
can adjust his investment in any set of links, ensuring that agents can always delete 
all their links, thereby guaranteeing that they receive weakly positive payoffs on 
stable networks, and (ii) any pair of agents can form a new link that would benefit 
them both, preventing the empty network from being stable. However, there are 
many stronger definitions of stability that might be used and would permit addi-
tional deviations.
Permitting additional deviations can only make fewer networks stable and 
strengthen the bound on overinvestment inefficiency. Moreover, the constructive 
proof that  100 percent underinvestment is possible whenever  β ≠ γ is robust to 
permitting many more deviations. As long as agents’ strategy sets remain the set 
of links they can invest in (so that transfers are still not permitted and the mapping 
from formed networks to payoffs cannot be manipulated), there are no profitable 
coalitional deviations. More precisely, for the constructive proof in which the empty 
network is the unique stable network, the empty network is also the unique strong 
Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous link formation game.35 Proposition 1 there-
fore extends to several stronger definitions of stability.
35 A strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann 1959) requires every coalition to play a best response. For a formal 
definition, and a proof of the statement, see Corollary 5 in the Appendix, section B. 
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Figure 6. Overinvestment Inefficiency Bound for m = n = 10, γ ∈ (0, 1), and β ∈ (0, 1)
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B. Protocol B
A critical assumption underlying Proposition 1 is that buyers and sellers cannot 
negotiate their investment shares. Underinvestment occurs when a buyer and a seller 
have positive net gains from trade by forming a link, but either the buyer or seller 
would extract more than these net gains from trade, thereby leaving the other worse 
off. If buyers and sellers could negotiate how much they each contribute toward 
forming a link, they would be able to find a split of the investment costs for which 
they are both better off. Underinvestment would then be eliminated. This intuition 
is now made precise.
Suppose now that a link is formed whenever the sum of the increases in a buyer 
and a seller’s utilities is greater than the cost of forming the link. This assumption 
can be motivated in a couple of ways. Most simply, buyers and sellers just have to 
make a joint investment where investment by one of them is perfectly substitutable 
with investment by the other. Alternatively, buyers and sellers may be able to make 
transfers to one another based on the (nonsubstitutable) investments they make.
To accommodate negotiated cost shares, we adjust the definition of a stable net-
work. First, the strategy space of the simultaneous link formation game is expanded. 
Each agent  k can now invest  I kk′ ∈ [0, c] in a link to each potential trade partner  k ′. 
A buyer’s strategy space is  [0, c] n , while a seller’s strategy space is  [0, c] m . Again, a 
link is formed if and only if a joint investment of at least  c is made in it. A network is 
a Nash equilibrium of the expanded simultaneous link formation game if all agents’ 
investments are mutual best responses. As in all pure strategy Nash equilibria joint 
investments of either  zero or  c must be made in each link, agents’ strategy spaces 
can be restricted, without loss of generality, to choosing investment shares  ( γ i j ,  γ j i ), 
such that  γ i j +  γ j i ∈ {0, 1} .
A network  L is pairwise nash stable with transfers36 if and only if it is a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium of the expanded simultaneous link formation game and 
unformed links would not jointly benefit the unconnected agents:  u i (L) +  v j (L) ≥ 
u i (L ∪ { l ij }) +  v j (L ∪ { l ij }) − c for all  l ij ∉ L . The Nash equilibrium requirement 
again ensures that agents’ individual rationality constraints are satisfied, while pair-
wise stability again prevents the empty network from always being stable.
It is assumed that if an additional link  l′ ∉ L were added to  L , the cost shares 
over each link  l ∈ L would remain the same on the network  L ∪ l ′ as they were 
on  L .37 Necessary and sufficient conditions for the efficient network to be pairwise 
Nash stable with transfers are identified and discussed in the online Appendix.38 Of 
particular interest is that a sufficient condition for the efficient network to be stable 
36 This terminology is from Bloch and Jackson (2006). The definition we use differs slightly because invest-
ments (transfers) are (implicitly) restricted to be weakly less than the cost of link formation ( c ), although this upper 
bound never binds. 
37 While this condition restricts the scope of possible profitable deviations (i.e., a link cannot be added and 
the cost shares of different links simultaneously changed), it is in the same spirit as pairwise Nash stability, which 
considers a network to be stable even if it is profitable for a link to be jointly formed while other links are simulta-
neously deleted. In this respect, pairwise Nash stability with transfers is a relatively minimal requirement. 
38 See Section OA-6 of the online Appendix. 
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is that agents have anti-assortative preferences.39 For  β ∈ (0, 1) and  c sufficiently 
small, this condition is also necessary.
PROPOSITION 2: under investment protocol B, the following hold:
 (i ) There is no underinvestment inefficiency in any stable network.
 (ii ) For all levels of buyer bargaining power  β ∈ [0, 1] , and all set of  P, Q of 
m ≥ 2 buyers and  n ≥ 2 sellers, respectively, there exist gains from trade  a 
with overinvestment inefficiency of 100 percent on all stable networks.
The Proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix, section B. Under protocol B, a 
buyer–seller pair can always agree to set the buyer’s investment cost share equal to 
his bargaining power ( γ i j = β ). Underinvestment inefficiency is then eliminated. 
In contrast, gains from trade can always be found in which the agents on the side of 
the market with lower bargaining power unilaterally establish outside option links 
to someone on the other side of the market who would otherwise be unmatched. 
Extending the example from Section I, for any parameter values  β, m, n , such that 
there are at least two buyers and two sellers, these outside options can be made just 
valuable enough for the side of the market with lower bargaining power to invest to 
the extent that all net gains from trade are lost.40
C. Discussion of results
Propositions 1 and 2 show that extreme inefficiency is possible under both proto-
col A and protocol B, although the protocol does affect what causes it.41 Removing 
underinvestment inefficiency problems by permitting buyers and sellers to endog-
enously negotiate their investment shares exacerbates overinvestment inefficiency 
problems insofar as they can no longer be bounded below  100 percent.
It is interesting to contrast Propositions 1 and 2 with the efficiency results from 
the previous literature. Kranton and Minehart (2001) show that when buyers have 
all the bargaining power ( β = 1 ) and have to pay all the costs of link formation 
( γ = 1 ), the efficient network is stable for any potential gains from trade  a .42 It 
is already well known that this result is sensitive to small changes in assumptions 
(Jackson 2008). However, Propositions 1 and 2 identify something further. There is 
a discontinuity in the inefficiency bound at this point, so that the possible efficiency 
39 This requires that no two buyers’ most preferred seller is the same when prices are  zero and no two sellers’ 
most preferred buyer is the same when sellers can extract all their potential gains from trade from each buyer. 
40 A stronger stability requirement in which any coalition could realize a profitable deviation would sometimes 
(but not always) reduce overinvestment inefficiency. The key constraint that prevents efficiency from always being 
achieved when all coalitional deviations are possible is that transfers between two agents are limited by their joint 
investment costs. For a case in which all gains from trade are still lost to overinvestment even when all coalitional 
deviations are possible, consider the example in Section I. The assumptions underlying the overinvestment result in 
Proposition 2 are discussed in Section VID. 
41 Section OA-6 of the online Appendix identifies conditions under which the stable network is efficient, and 
Section OA-8 shows how these conditions simplify in a vertically differentiated market. 
42 Kranton and Minehart (2001) also have uncertainty in their model. 
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losses go from being bounded at  0 percent to potentially consuming all the gains 
from trade.
COROLLARy 2: When buyers have all the bargaining power ( β = 1 ) and have 
to pay all the costs of link formation ( γ = 1 ), the efficient network is stable for any 
potential gains from trade  a . Furthermore, there does not exist a stable network 
with any inefficiency due to overinvestment in non-trade links or underinvestment in 
trade links. However, if  β < 1 or  γ < 1 , or if investments are made under protocol 
B, there exist potential gains from trade  a , where, on even the most efficient stable 
network, all the gains from trade are lost to inefficiencies.
VI. Applications
A. High-skill Labor Markets
There is an extensive “directed search’’ literature that models workers targeting 
their search toward certain firms. For the most part, this literature models firms 
posting nonnegotiable wages, and finds that labor market search is efficient in many 
dimensions.43 However, while firms post wages in some markets, in other markets 
wages are negotiated. Hall and Krueger (2008) survey workers about the wage 
determination process for their most recent jobs. They find that somewhere between 
one-third and two-thirds of workers bargain over their wages, and that wage negoti-
ations are more prevalent in high-skill markets.
A couple of recent papers model simultaneous bargaining between workers and 
firms following application and interview decisions. These papers typically avoid 
the technical difficulties generated by modeling multilateral bargaining in the result-
ing networked market. Gautier and Holzner (2013) is an exception. However, they 
assume that all potential worker–firm pairs generate a surplus of either  one or  zero . 
The approach taken in this paper permits search inefficiencies to be explored in a 
model with heterogeneous gains from trade, which are a prominent feature of high-
skill labor markets.44
Suppose that a firm and worker must invest in an interview before the worker can 
be employed by that firm. Preparing for and then conducting the interview can be 
costly for the firm, especially in high-skill labor markets, where time may have to be 
invested by senior management. Interview preparation can also be costly for work-
ers, but to a first approximation, firms seem likely to bear the majority of these costs. 
There are limited ways in which firms can pass interview costs onto workers, and 
investments by the worker into the interview process cannot (effectively) substitute 
for effort by the firm. We therefore apply investment protocol A to these markets.
How valuable outside options are to agents depends on their bargaining powers.
43 See, for example, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), where investments can be made prior to matching to increase 
the available gains from trade. 
44 Elliott (2014) also uses the second-stage model developed here to determine matches and the terms of trade 
in networked labor markets. The paper investigates the fragility of labor markets in the presence of shocks. Workers 
and firms pay only entry costs to search, and so investments are not relationship-specific. 
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Remark 1: When firms (respectively, workers) have all the bargaining power 
( β = 1 , respectively,  β = 0 ), their payoffs are independent of their outside options. 
Moreover, how sensitive an agent’s payoff is to his outside option is decreasing 
in his bargaining power—whenever there is a unique efficient match, for a firm  i , 
 ∂ u i / ∂ u _i = 1 − β ; and for a worker  j ,  ∂ v j / ∂ v _j = β .
Casual observation of high-skill labor markets suggests that workers value their 
outside options more than firms. While it is common for workers to use alternative 
employment opportunities to improve their terms of employment, it is harder to find 
examples of firms using their alternative employment opportunities to affect their 
terms of trade with workers. This is suggestive of firms’ having most of the bargain-
ing power, which also accords with the observation that firms tend to make offers to 
workers more frequently than workers make offers (or counteroffers) to firms. We 
therefore assume that  β is high.
So far, we have argued that firm bargaining power ( β ) is typically high, and the 
firm’s cost share when establishing a link ( γ ) is also typically high. From Section VB, 
we know that when  β = γ there is no underinvestment. While Proposition 1 shows 
that large inefficiencies are possible for all  γ ≠ β , the possible gains from trade for 
which this will happen get smaller as  β and  γ get closer.
COROLLARy 3: For any  γ ≠ β , there is  100 percent underinvestment inefficiency 
in a stable network if and only if
  c <  max 
i, j 
  a i j <  max   
 { γ __β c,  1 − γ ____1 − β c} . 
For any  γ and any  β , define  γ′ = λγ + (1 − λ)β , where  λ is a parameter. 
Corollary 3 implies that, for any  λ ∈ (0, 1) , if there is  100 percent underinvestment 
inefficiency in a stable network for a market  (a, γ′, β) , then there is also  100 percent 
underinvestment inefficiency in a stable network for the market  (a, γ, β) . As  γ gets 
further away from  β , the set of potential surpluses for which there is  100 percent 
inefficiency in a stable network weakly increases in the strong set order. Section A 
of the Appendix characterizes the underinvestment inefficiency bound for a simple 
example and illustrates this implication of Corollary 3.
Corollary 3 also shows that the possibility of underinvestment depends on market 
thickness. Suppose that the potential surplus any worker–firm pair can generate is 
drawn independently at random before the game begins. The expected number of 
surplus draws over the threshold  max {γc / β, (1 − γ)c / (1 − β)} , is then a constant 
fraction of the number of potential worker–firm pairs. If, for example, there are 
n = m workers and firms, the expected number of such draws is proportional to  n 2 . 
In thicker markets, workers and firms will, on average, have opportunities for bet-
ter matches, reducing the possibility of underinvestment. Underinvestment is more 
likely in thin markets, although for any fixed level of market thickness, the possibil-
ity of underinvestment goes to zero as  β approaches  γ .
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We now consider overinvestment. Recall that the function  h(γ, β, m, n) provides a 
tight bound on overinvestment inefficiency for  γ ∈ (0, 1) and  β ∈ (0, 1) .45
COROLLARy 4: For a fixed  β ∈ (0, 1) , it is precisely when  γ = β that overin-
vestment is most severe:  β =  arg max 
γ∈(0, 1)
   h (γ, β, m, n) .
The Proof of Corollary 4 is in the Appendix, section B, and the result is illus-
trated in Figure 6. Although Corollary 4 shows that for a fixed  β , overinvestment is 
potentially worst when  β = γ , the bound on overinvestment is still quite tight when 
β is high (and  γ = β ). For example, if  β = γ = 0.9 and  m = n = 20 , then 
h(0.9, 0.9, 20, 20) = 0.12 and overinvestment is at most  12 percent of the potential 
gains from trade.
This analysis suggests that we should not expect to see too much evidence of 
underinvestment, especially when markets are fairly thick, but we might see some 
overinvestment. It also provides a reason to exercise caution when considering labor 
market interventions that would subsidize interview costs.
B. Industry consolidation
When one firm wants to take over another, substantial relationship-specific 
investments are required. Due diligence costs are directly paid to lawyers, fees are 
paid to investment banks, and senior executives’ time is forgone. Potential acquirers 
are typically not willing to make unconditional offers prior to due diligence, and 
while offers conditional on successful due diligence are often made, in practice what 
constitutes successful due diligence is noncontractible.46 As such agreements are 
typically nonbinding and can be renegotiated, to a first approximation the market 
behaves as if investments in due diligence precede negotiations to determine the 
terms of an acquisition.
In the case of acquisitions, there is evidence that industries undergo periods of 
consolidation and many mergers occur in waves clustered by industry. This suggests 
that acquisition decisions are often made in a market context.47 Links are formed by 
potential acquirers undertaking a costly due diligence process. Target firms also have 
to agree to this process, and it may be costly for them to do so—revealing private 
information, particularly to a competitor, can reduce the value of the firm to other 
potential acquirers. When mergers occur, there is evidence that the network struc-
ture affects the acquisition price. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) find that competition to 
acquire a target firm redistributes rents to the target from the acquirer, while James 
and Wier (1987) study bank acquisitions and show that competition matters on both 
sides of the market. An acquirer’s takeover gains are increasing in the number of 
alternative target firms and decreasing in the number of other potential acquirers.
45 A closed-form expression for  h(γ, β, m, n) is provided in Lemma 2 in the Appendix, section B. 
46 The following is a quote from Howson (2003): “not surprisingly, therefore, the buyer will want to retain its 
freedom to renegotiate some of the fundamental issues […] such as the price. […] In common law countries […] the 
document is little more than a non-binding agreement to negotiate.’’ 
47 See Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001). 
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Although, on the face of it, investments in due diligence are nonsubstitutable, 
Officer (2003) reports that almost two-thirds of the merger agreements announced 
between 1997 and 1999 included a target termination fee clause. These clauses 
require the target to pay a fixed fee to the acquirer if the taget does not consummate 
the proposed merger.48 Given these termination fees, protocol B is a better fit than 
protocol A.
Under protocol B, the theory predicts that there will be no underinvestment but 
that overinvestment can be severe. Indeed, the practice of finding alternative acquir-
ers to get the acquisition price bid up is common. An example from 2006 is when 
Arcelor found itself the target of a hostile takeover bid by its competitor Mittal Steel. 
Arcelor searched for a white knight and persuaded Severstal to enter the bidding. 
Mittal Steel eventually acquired Arcelor with an improved bid, and Arcelor paid 
Severstal a $177 million “fine’’ for the failure of Severstal’s bid (Dealbook 2006).49 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) provide another example. Paraphrasing:
By 1989 craig Mccaw had acquired cellular phone licenses covering 
50 million potential customers, but he wanted a national network which 
he could obtain by acquiring LIn Broadcasting corporation. Although 
there were many potential acquirers of LIn, Mccaw valued LIn much 
more than any of them. As with any takeover there were substantial costs 
associated with the due diligence process—advisory fees would have to 
be paid and managerial time forgone. Aware that they would likely be 
outbid by Mccaw, no other potential acquirers entered the bidding. LIn 
responded by agreeing to compensate Bell south for bidding, paying them 
about $75 million. Bell south is estimated to have bid up the acquisition 
price Mccaw paid for LIn by about $1 billion to about $6.5 billion.
One way in which overinvestment might be limited is by exclusivity agreements 
between a target and an acquirer. Such agreements can commit the target to not form 
links with alternative acquirers, thereby avoiding overinvestment.50 While exclu-
sive-dealing contracts can have efficiency benefits, the Delaware Supreme Court has 
ruled against the use of such takeover defenses in omnicare, Inc. v. ncs Healthcare, 
Inc.51
In 2002, NCS Healthcare was insolvent. After Genesis showed interest in an 
acquisition, NCS agreed to use takeover defenses, including an exclusive-dealing 
contract, to prevent it from considering alternative offers. In effect, NCS agreed to 
bind their hands and to not use an alternative acquirer to bid up their price. However, 
NCS’s competitor, Omnicare, did make an alternative bid for NCS (conditional on 
due diligence). NCS did not fully consider this bid and did not reveal their books to 
48 Termination fees can be large. In 2005 Guidant paid a termination fee of $705 million to Johnson and Johnson 
after accepting a competing offer. 
49 Congruent with the model, Officer (2003) finds that termination fee use by targets is beneficial to their 
shareholders. 
50 Shleifer and Vishney (1986) consider how takeover defenses can benefit a target firm’s shareholders. Segal 
and Whinston (2000) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994) both also recognize potential efficiency benefits from 
exclusive-dealing contracts. 
51 Delaware courts are influential in corporation law, and the precedent set by the case might dissuade the 
boards of other takeover targets from taking defensive measures in the future, although subsequent cases such as 
Orman versus Cullen have helped to limit the scope of the Omnicare decision. 
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Omnicare. Omnicare (and some NCS stockholders) then took NCS to court, claim-
ing that NCS had neglected their fiduciary responsibilities to stockholders. The 
case, omnicare, Inc. v. ncs Healthcare, Inc., ended up in the Delaware Supreme 
Court, which reached a  3 : 2 majority decision against NCS. This undermines the role 
 defensive measures might otherwise play in preventing future overinvestments. In 
accordance with this view, the omnicare, Inc. v. ncs Healthcare, Inc. decision has 
been critiqued by Chief Justice Veasey.52
C. Gas Pipelines
When investments are made in the construction of pipelines, there is not a clear 
delineation between the investments the buying country and the selling country 
should make. Indeed, both countries need to contribute to the same investment, the 
construction of a pipeline between them. Moreover, there is direct evidence of nego-
tiations over construction costs.53 We therefore apply protocol B.
Our model abstracts from a couple of potentially important features of the natural 
gas market. First, it is assumed that the network is bipartite, eliminating the scope 
for intermediation. Second, not all buyers have the same demand and not all sup-
pliers have the same supply. While the model is quite far removed from the natural 
gas market application, the contention of this section is that it can nevertheless yield 
some insights.
Under protocol B there should be no underinvestment, but substantial overinvest-
ment is possible. There are many examples of possible overinvestments. Before the 
pipeline between Turkmenistan and China was built, Turkmenistan relied largely 
on exporting to Russia. One motive for building the pipeline with China, in accor-
dance with the forces studied in this paper, appears to be so that Turkmenistan could 
improve its terms of trade with Russia.54
Europe relies heavily on gas supplies from Russia. Moreover, it appears that 
Russia has much of the bargaining power and is able to extract most of the 
gains from trade. It is politically infeasible for Europe to not import sufficient 
gas to heat homes in the winter. Thus, buyer bargaining power  β is likely low, 
increasing the incentives for Europe to invest in alternative sources of supply (see 
Remark 1).
The proposed  3,300 km Nabucco pipeline would connect Europe to gas supplies 
in the Middle East. One reason for the EU’s potential investment in Nabucco, esti-
mated to eventually cost $  12 .3 billion  (Reuters (Reuters 05/29/08)) , is likely to 
improve their terms of trade with Russia.55 Alternative pipelines that would connect 
Europe with Middle Eastern gas supplies, such as the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, have 
also been proposed. While it might be argued that higher import capacity is  necessary 
52 See Oravetz (2004). 
53 One example is the pipeline between Turkmenistan and China. Negotiations over how to split the construction 
costs began in April 2006, and in July 2007 the Chinese National Petroleum Company and Turkmengaz reached 
an agreement. 
54 “After a number of high-profile moves in recent months to raise the price of Turkmen natural gas for Russia, 
Ukraine, and Iran, [ Turkmen president] Niyazov has now signed a deal with China to build an export pipeline to the 
east that would break Russia’s monopoly on export routes for Turkmen gas’’ (Cutler 2010). 
55 There are likely to be many other important factors also at play. 
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to meet rising demand in Europe, it would most likely be cheaper to increase the 
capacity of existing pipelines. In addition, Russia has proposed building additional 
pipelines, Nord Stream and South Stream, into Europe.56
D. Assumptions
The model relies on a couple of important assumptions. First, it is assumed that 
buyer–seller pairs cannot write long-term enforceable contracts that specify their 
future terms of trade. If it were possible to write such contracts, the incentives for 
overinvestment would be directly removed, and terms of trade that ensure there is no 
underinvestment could be negotiated. Whether such contracts are used is an appli-
cation-specific question. When international pipelines are built to enable the trade 
of natural resources, there is typically no effective court to enforce contracted future 
terms of trade and changing political climates can undermine agreements made by 
current leaders. There are several examples of ex post renegotiation (Wälde 2008). 
Regarding industry consolidation, as already argued, contracts conditional on due 
diligence are typically unenforceable. In high-skill labor markets there is also little 
evidence of contracts being signed prior to interviews.
A second important feature of the model is that transfers are restricted. An agent 
k cannot make any transfers when cost shares are exogenous, and when cost shares 
are endogenous the transfers  k can make are limited to those that compensate other 
agents for their investment in forming links to  k . This means that transfers from a 
buyer  i to a seller  j cannot be made conditional on the other links  j forms, and no 
transfer is possible between  i and  j if the link  l i j is not formed. Finally, the size of 
transfers is capped at the cost of link formation  c . These transfers are sufficient for 
preventing underinvestment but not overinvestment. If unrestricted transfers from 
one agent to another could be made contingent on all the links formed by the other 
agent, the efficient network would always be stable (Bloch and Jackson 2007).
There are mechanisms through which more general transfers than we consider 
may be possible in practice. In the industry consolidation application, we discussed 
the potential of exclusivity agreements to make a transfer from  i to  j conditional on 
j not forming any other links, thereby reducing overinvestment. Also, in a dynamic 
version of the model, the threat of overinvestment could be sufficient to affect the 
terms of trade. The instances of overinvestment discussed in relation to the applica-
tions in Section VI suggest that at least some of the time such threats alone are not 
enough. Finally, in some applications, interactions are dynamic and the costs asso-
ciated with maintaining links overshadows the costs of establishing links.57 In these 
cases, dynamic game effects are likely to be more important.
56 At present, gas from Russia has to travel through either Ukraine or Belarus, with 80 percent coming through 
Ukraine, to reach Europe. This has led to hold-up problems and disputes. The planned Nord Stream and South 
Stream pipelines would transport natural gas directly into Europe. 
57 Lee and Fong (2013) have a dynamic model that takes an approach along these lines. 
voL. 7 no. 4 69Elliott: inEfficiEnciEs in nEtworkEd MarkEts
VII. Conclusions
In many markets a buyer and a seller must make a relationship-specific invest-
ment before they can trade. We study inefficiencies in these markets by building on 
the work of Kranton and Minehart (2000b, 2000a, 2001). We extend their model 
to consider different levels of bargaining power, different costs shares, negotiated 
investments, and ex ante heterogeneous gains from trade. These generalizations are 
important for fitting the model to different applications: both whether there is scope 
for intervention to avoid inefficiencies, and what this intervention should look like, 
depend on this fit. We also ask new questions: how inefficient can these invest-
ments be? How can these inefficiencies be categorized? This requires new tools. To 
reveal agents’ incentives to invest in different links, we develop an algorithm that 
identifies how the structure of a networked market influences payoffs. To analyze 
the size of inefficiencies, we use the cost of anarchy and price of anarchy from the 
computer science literature and explore the bounds on inefficiency across all stable 
networks. To investigate the size of different types of inefficiency, we define mea-
sures of overinvestment inefficiency and underinvestment inefficiency by adapting 
the cost of anarchy and price of anarchy to these specific types of inefficiency. We 
find that when investments are fixed and made separately, overinvestment is limited 
but—except in a knife-edge case—underinvestment due to hold-up problems can 
eliminate all the gains from trade. In contrast, when buyers and sellers can negotiate 
their investment shares, underinvestment inefficiency is eliminated but overinvest-
ment inefficiency can consume all the gains from trade.
We apply the model to three applications: high-skill labor markets, industry con-
solidation, and the international trade of natural gas. While the model abstracts from 
details that could be important in all these markets, it nevertheless provides insights 
into the frictions present. The model can also help shed light on policy questions. 
For example, it provides an efficiency rationale for exclusivity agreements in net-
worked markets and a framework for evaluating the potential of subsidizing inter-
view costs to improve the functioning of high-skill labor markets. Although beyond 
the scope of the current paper, there are also modifications that could be made to 
tailor the model to additional applications. One limitation of the current approach 
is the unit demand and unit supply assumption. There are several examples of net-
worked markets where this assumption does not fit well: traders of agricultural pro-
duce in Madagascar trade via multiple relationships (Fafchamps and Minten 1999); 
corporate lawyers are instructed by multiple businesses (Lancaster and Uzzi 2012); 
suppliers trade with more than one manufacturer (Uzzi 1997); and restaurateurs buy 
from more than one vendor at fish markets (Kirman and Vriend 2000). Recent the-
oretical work has shown that with multi-unit demands and supplies, the set of com-
petitive equilibria58 has the same lattice structure as with unit demand and supply 
(Milgrom 2009; Jaume, MassÓ, and Neme 2012). These results provide a platform 
58 With unit demand and unit supply, pairwise stable outcomes, core outcomes, and the competitive equilibria all 
coinside. This is not true generally. In competitive equilibria a seller must offer the same price to all buyers. While 
this nondiscrimination constraint never binds in the unit demand and unit supply case, it can bind more generally. 
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for the approach taken in this paper to be extended to include buyers with heteroge-
neous demands and suppliers with heterogeneous supplies.
Appendix
A. size of Inefficiencies
This section considers the size of inefficiencies, rather than just bounds on the size 
of inefficiencies, for a simple example: buyer bargaining power  β =  1 _2 where there 
is one buyer and two sellers with potential gains from trade  a 11 and  a 12 , respectively. 
All values of  a 11 and  a 12 are considered ( c is normalized to  1 ). Under investment 
protocol A, the size of underinvestment inefficiency is shown in Figure A1, panel A 
for different values of  γ and  max ( a 11 ,  a 12 ) . There is no overinvestment inefficiency 
for  γ ∈ (0, 1) . Under investment protcol B, the size of overinvestment inefficiency 
is shown in  Figure A1, panel B  for different values of  a 11 and  a 12 .
Underinvestment inefficiency of  100 percent under protocol A is more perva-
sive than  100 percent overinvestment inefficiency under protocol B. However, when 
underinvestment inefficiency is not  100 percent it is  0 percent , while for a wide 
range of parameters there is some overinvestment inefficiency.
B. Proofs
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
It will be assumed that a seller  j′ is removed from the network. The proof for 
removing a buyer is symmetric. We also assume, for simplicity, that there is a unique 
match that maximizes the gains from trade following the removal of any agent. This 
is generically true. The result and proof can be extended to include the non-generic 
case by comparing the sets of links that might be rematched over following the 
removal of an agent to the set of possible network decompositions.
Two definitions will be helpful. A chain is a sequence of different links of the 
following form:
  l  i 1  j 2  ,  l  j 2  i  2  ,  l  i 2   j  3  ,  l  j  3  i  3  , … ,  l  i  k   j  k  .
A chain may end at any time as long as preceding links have been in a sequence 
of this form. A cycle is a sequence of links of the following form:
  l  i 1  j 2  ,  l  j  2 i  2  ,  l  i 2 j  3  ,  l  j  3 i  3  , … ,  l  i  k j k  ,  l  j  k i 1  .
Now it will be shown that no subset of links from  L j′ + ∪  L j′ − can be arranged 
into a cycle. Suppose, toward a contradiction, that links  L ̃ j′ + ⊆  L j′ + and  L ̃ j′ − ⊆  L j′ − 
can be arranged into a cycle. Consider the initial (optimal) matching in  L , before 
j ′ was removed. As the links in  L ̃ j′ + ∪  L ̃ j′ − can be arranged into a cycle, it is feasible 
to instead match over the links in  L ̃ j′ + while no longer matching over the links  L ̃ j′ − , 
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without removing  j ′ from the network and without any other rematching. For the 
initial match to maximize the gains from trade,  ∑ l∈ L ̃ j ′ +  α l <  ∑ l∈ L ̃ j ′ −  α l . Consider 
now the optimal matching in  L \ { j′} . Relative to the initial matching, in this opti-
mal match the links in  L j′ + are matched over and the links in  L j′ − are no longer 
matched over. However, as the links in  L ̃ j′ + ∪  L j′ − can be arranged into a cycle, it 
is feasible to instead match over the links in  L j′ − while no longer matching over 
the links in  L ̃ j′ + , without affecting any of the other matches. It then follows that 
 ∑ l∈ L ̃ j ′ +   α l >  ∑ l∈ L ̃ j ′ −  α l . This is a contradiction. We have proved that no subset of 
links in  L j′ + ∪  L j′ − can be arranged into a cycle.
The same logic establishes that a buyer  i ′ cannot rematch when  j ′ is removed 
from  L unless  i ′’s trade partner in  L  ( μ ∗ ( i ′ ; α(L))) is also rematched (or has been 
removed). Suppose that  μ ∗ (i′; α(L)) is neither rematched nor removed from the net-
work, but  i ′ is rematched. Consider the rematching chain starting from  i ′ . For the net-
work  L \ {  j′ } , this rematching could be undone and every person in the chain instead 
matched to their trade partner in  L , without affecting any of the other rematchings. 
As it was not optimal to implement the rematching starting at  i ′ in the network  L , it 
cannot be optimal to implement it in the network  L \ {  j′ } either. This is now shown 
more formally. Suppose, toward a contradiction, that a link  l i′j ∈  L j′ + , but that for 
all  i ,  l i μ ∗ (i′ ) ∉  L j′ + , so that  μ ∗ ( i ′ ) is not rematched. Denote by  L ˆ j′ + ⊆  L j′ + and  L ˆ j′ − ⊆ 
L j′ − the links in the maximum-length chain that can be constructed starting at link 
l i′j using links  l ∈  L j′ + ∪  L j′ − . As  μ ∗ (i′) is not rematched, the buyers in this maxi-
mum-length chain need not rematch—all other rematches not involving them would 
still be possible if they did not rematch. Rematching over these links following the 
removal of  j ′ must maximize the gains from trade, and so  ∑ l∈ L ˆ j ′ +   α l >  ∑ l∈ L ˆ j ′ −  α l . 
However, this rematch was possible in the initial network but not implemented, and 
so:  ∑ l∈ L ˆ j ′ +  α l <  ∑ l∈ L ˆ j ′ −  α l . This is a contradiction.
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Figure A1. The Size of Inefficiencies with Exogenous and Endogenous Cost Shares
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It follows that the links  l ∈  L j′ + ∪  L j′ − can be arranged into a chain starting with 
link  l j′μ∗( j′ ) . Relabeling buyers and sellers, set  j 1 = j ′ and denote this chain by
  s(  j 1 ) ≔  ( l  j 1 i 1  ,  l  i 1  j 2  ,  l  j 2 i 2  ,  l  i 2   j 3  , … ) .
It is helpful to introduce some notation for “subchains.” Let  s  j k  (  j 1 ) denote the 
subsequence of  s(  j 1 ) containing all links up to but not including  l  j k i k  , and let  s  j k  ( j 1 ) 
denote the subsequence of  s( j 1 ) containing the link  l  j k i k  and all links after it. Thus, 
s(  j 1 ) = ( s  j k  (  j 1 ),  s  j k  ( j 1 )) . The remainder of the proof will establish that, if a seller  j k 
is rematched following the removal of  j 1 , then  s(  j k ) =  s  j k  ( j 1 ) .
Define the gains from rematching over the sequence  s(j) if  j is removed from  L by
  Gr (s( j)) ≔  ∑ l∈ L j +  α l −  ∑ l∈ L j − / l  μ ∗ ( j ) j  α l .
It will now be shown that if seller  j k rematches in  s( j 1 ) , then  j 1 cannot rematch 
in  s( j k ) . Suppose, toward a contradiction, that  l  j k i k  ∈ s(  j 1 ) , so that  j k is rematched 
when  j 1 is removed, and that  l  j 1 i 1  ∈ s(  j k ) , so that  j 1 is rematched when  j k is removed. 
As  j 1 is rematched when  j k is removed, the subsequence of rematchings  s  j 1  ( j k ) is a 
possible rematching when  j 1 is removed. However, this rematching must generate 
weakly lower gains from rematching than the optimal rematch:
(A1)  Gr ( s  j 1  (  j k )) ≤ Gr (s( j 1 )) = Gr ( s  j k  ( j 1 )) + Gr ( s  j k  ( j 1 )) .
Similarly, as  j k is rematched when  j 1 is removed, the subsequence of rematchings 
s  j k  (  j 1 ) is a possible rematching when  j k is removed. However, this rematching must 
generate weakly lower gains from rematching than the optimal rematch:
(A2)  Gr ( s  j k  (  j 1 )) ≤ Gr (s( j k )) = Gr ( s  j 1  (  j k )) + Gr ( s  j 1  ( j k )) .
Combining equations A1 and A2:  Gr ( s  j k  ( j 1 )) + Gr ( s  j 1  ( j k )) ≥ 0 . However, the 
sequence of links  ( s  j k  ( j 1 ),  s  j 1  ( j k )) is a cycle. As the gains from rematching over this 
cycle are weakly positive and this rematching is feasible in the initial network, the 
initial match cannot have (uniquely) maximized the gains from trade. This is a 
contradiction.
Thus,  j 1 cannot rematch in  s( j k ) if seller  j k rematches in  s( j 1 ) . An equivalent argu-
ment establishes that for all  k′ < k ,  j k′ cannot rematch in  s(  j k ) if seller  k rematches 
in  s( j 1 ) .
This result will now be used to show that if  j k is rematched following the removal 
of  j 1 , then the same subsequent rematching would be optimal if  j k were removed 
instead of  j 1 . In other words,  s( j k ) =  s  j k  ( j 1 ) . As the rematch following the removal 
of  j k is optimal,  Gr(s( j k )) ≥ Gr ( s  j k  (  j 1 )) . However, as there is no  k′ < k such 
that  j  k ′  can rematch in  s(  j k ) , the rematch  ( s  j k  (  j 1 ), s(  j k )) following the removal 
of  j 1 is feasible. By the optimality of the rematch following the removal of  j 1 , 
 Gr( s  j k  (   j 1 )) + Gr( s  j k  (  j 1 )) ≥ Gr( s  j k  (  j 1 ) + Gr(s( j k )) . Combining the inequali-
ties,  Gr(s(  j k )) = Gr( s  j k  ( j 1 )) and  s(  j k ) =  s  j k  (  j 1 ) .
Using the symmetry of buyers and sellers and the fact that each agent is rematched 
(by definition) to his outside trade partner when his trade partner is removed from 
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the network,  L  μ ∗ (k) + =  L k dl and  L  μ ∗ (k) − =  L k sl ∪ { l k μ ∗ (k) } . Furthermore, it has already 
been shown that the links in  L  μ ∗ (k) + ∪  L  μ ∗ (k) − can be arranged into a chain (and do not 
cycle). It now follows that outside option chains do not cycle either. ∎
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
Let  j =  μ ∗ (i) .
(A3)  u _i =  α i j −  _ v j =  α i j −  ( ∑ l∈ L j −  α l −  ∑ l∈ L j +  α l ) =  ∑ l∈ L i dl  α l −  ∑ l∈ L i sl  α l . 
The first equality in equation A3 follows from the lattice structure of core 
 payoffs—buyer  i receives his outside option (his minimum core payoff ) when  j 
receives his maximum core payoff—as matched buyer–seller pairs split their gains 
from trade. The second equality follows from Démange (1982) and Leonard (1983) , 
who show that in this environment an agent’s maximum core payoff is equal to his 
marginal contribution to total surplus. The final equality follows from Lemma 1. 
Equivalent calculations establish the result for sellers’ outside options. ∎
PROOF OF COROLLARy 1:
From the lattice structure of the core,  
_ v η (i) =  α  μ ∗ (η (i)) η (i) −  u _ μ ∗ (η (i))  . From 
Lemma 1,  μ ∗ (η (i)) ’s outside option chain will be a proper subset of  i ’s outside 
option chain. Theorem 1 can then be used to relate  i ’s and  μ ∗ (η(i)) ’s outside option 
payoffs to each other:  u _i =  α iη(i) −  α  μ ∗ (η (i))η (i) +  u _ μ ∗ (η(i)) . Combining the above 
equalities,  
_ v η (i) +  u _i =  α iη (i) . As  _ v η (i) ≥  v η (i) whenever  η (i) receives a core pay-
off,  v η(i) +  u _i ≤  α iη(i) . Thus, if  i ever received a payoff less than  u _i ,  i , and  η (i) 
would have a profitable deviation by trading with each other. An equivalent calcula-
tion can be shown for a seller  j . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Proposition 1 will be proved through two lemmas. First, it will be shown that 
efficiency losses due to overinvestment are bounded.
LEMMA 2: For exogenous cost shares  γ ∈ (0, 1) and homogeneous potential 
gains from trade  a where  a ij ∈ {0, 1} , there is no overinvestment inefficiency. For 
any (heterogeneous) potential gains from trade  a , overinvestment inefficiency is 
bounded by the amounts shown in Table A1, and this bound is tight.
This proof is undertaken in five parts. In Part (i) the homogeneous gains from 
the trade case is considered. Part (ii) corresponds to the first row in Table A1, part 
(iii) to the second row, part (iv) to rows five and six, and part (v) to rows three, four, 
seven, and eight. In each part the existence of the bound and its tightness is proved.
Before beginning, note that when  β ∈ (0, 1) and  γ ∈ (0, 1) , all non-trade links 
must benefit both parties and, as outside option chains cannot cycle (Lemma 1), 
each component with any non-trade links must take the form of a chain, as shown in 
Figure A2 for the case of four trade links. This insight underlies the proofs of parts 
(i) and (ii).
74 AMErIcAn EconoMIc JournAL: MIcroEconoMIcs novEMBEr 2015
Part (i): Consider a component with non-trade links. With homogeneous gains 
from trade, Theorem 1 can be directly applied to show that  u _i = 0 for all buy-
ers in the component and  v _j = 0 for all sellers in the component. Thus, there are 
 insufficient incentives for any outside option links to be formed, and there is no 
outside overinvestment inefficiency in any stable network.
Part (ii): Label buyers and sellers as in Figure A1, but with  K ̃ buyers and  K ̃ sell-
ers. As neither  b  K ̃ nor  s 1 has an outside trade partner  u _ K ̃ = 0 and  v _1 = 0 , and so 
u  K ̃ = β _ u  K ̃ and  v 1 = (1 − β) v _1 . For buyer  b  K ̃ and seller  s 1 to then have sufficient 
incentives to form their trade links we must have
(A4)  _ v 1 ≥  (1 − γ)c ______1 − β ,                    
_ u  K ̃ ≥  γc __β . 
Applying Theorem 1,
(A5)  _ v 1 =  ∑ 
k=2
j
 ( α k−1, k−1 −  α k−1, k ) +  _ v j ≥  (1 − γ)c ______(1 − β) , 
(A6)  _ u  K ̃ =  ∑ 
k=i+1
  K 
̃
 ( α k, k −  α k−1, k ) +  _ u i ≥  γc __β ,  
for  j ∈  {2,… ,  K ̃} and  i ∈  {1,… ,  K ̃ − 1} .
All buyers other than  b  K ̃ and all sellers other than  s 1 must have suf-
ficient incentives to form their outside option links. Thus, for  j ≠ 1 , 
β v _j + (1 − β) _ v j − (1 − β) _ v j ≥ (1 − γ)c ; and similarly for  i ≠  K ̃ , (1 − β) u _i ≥ γc . Applying Theorem 1 again,
(A7)  u _i =  ∑ 
k=i+1
  K 
̃
 ( α k−1, k −  α k, k ) ≥  γc _____ (1 − β), 
(A8)  v _j =  ∑ 
k=2
j
 ( α k−1, k −  α k−1, k−1 ) ≥  (1 − γ)c ______β ,  
Table A1—Bounding Overinvestment Inefficiency
β γ Bound on overinvestment inefficiency
∈ (0, 1) ∈ (0, 1) h( K ̃, γ, β) ≤  1 _2∈ {0, 1} ∈ (0, 1) 0
0 0 0
∈ (0, 0.5) 0  β ____ 
 1 − β∈ [0.5, 1] 0 1
∈ [0, 0.5] 1 1
∈ (0.5, 1) 1  1 − β ____β 
1 1 0 
notes: Where  K ̃ = min {m, n} the number of agents on the short side of the market and  h ( K ̃, γ, β) 
≔  ( K ̃ − 1) (max { ( K ̃  − 1) + (1 − γ)  _____________  1 − β  +  ( K ̃ − 1)(1 −γ)  ___________β  ,  ( K ̃ − 1) + (γ)  __________β  +  ( K ̃ − 1) (γ)  _________1 − β  } −  K ̃) 
−1
 . 
When β ∈ {0, 1} and  γ ∈ (0, 1) the unique stable network is the empty network.
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for  j ∈  {2,…,  K ̃} and  i ∈  {1,…,  K ̃ − 1} . Combining equations (A5 ) , (A6 ) , (A7 ) , 
and (A8 ) ,
(A9)   _ v j ≥  (1 − γ)c ______(1 − β) +  ∑ k=2
j
 ( α k−1, k −  α k−1, k−1 ) ≥  (1 − γ)c ______(1 − β) +  
(1 − γ)c ______β , 
(A10)  _ u i ≥  γc __β +  ∑ k=i+1 
 K ̃ ( α k−1, k −  α k, k ) ≥  γc __β +  
γc _____ (1 − β),  
for  j ∈  {2,… ,  K ̃} and  i ∈  {1,… ,  K ̃ − 1} . The gains from trade in a network are 
equal to the total payoffs received by all parties. Combining equations (A4 ) , (A7 ) , 
and (A10 ) and then equations (A4 ) , (A8 ) , and (A10 ) :
  ∑ 
k=1
 K ̃ α k, k =  ∑ 
k=1
 K ̃ ( u _k +  _ v k ) ≥ ( K ̃ − 1) ( 1 _____ (1 − β) +  1 − γ ____β ) c +  1 − γ ____1 − β c
 ≔  f 1 ( K ̃, γ, β)c, 
  ∑ 
k=1
 K ̃ α k, k =  ∑ 
k=1
 K ̃ ( _ u k +  v _k ) ≥ ( K ̃ − 1) ( 1 __β +  γ _____ (1 − β)) c +  γ __β c ≔  f 2 ( K ̃, γ, β)c. 
This provides a lower bound on the gains from trade reached with  K ̃ trade links. 
The net gains from trade in the network if all outside options links were removed 
would be at least  max { f 1 ( K ̃, γ, β)c,   f 2 ( K ̃, γ, β)c} −  K ̃c . As  ( K ̃ − 1)c is invested 
in outside option links, this provides following upper bound on overinvestment 
inefficiency
  h( K ̃, γ, β ) ≔ ( K ̃ − 1) ( max    { f 1 ( K ̃, γ, β),   f 2 ( K ̃, γ, β)} −  K ̃) 
−1
 . 
Thus, for all stable components with  K ̃ matches, all levels of buyer bargaining 
power  β ∈ (0, 1) , and all buyer cost shares  γ ∈ (0, 1) ,  oII ≤ h ( K ̃, γ, β) .
To show that OII is always less than  50 percent , the bound derived above can be 
maximized over  β and  γ :  ‾ oII ≔  max β, γ  {h( K ̃, γ, β)} = h ( K ̃,  1 _2,  1 _2) =  1 _2. This is 
independent of  K ̃.
It will now be shown that the bound derived above is tight. Consider 
a component with  K ̃ matches and  β ≥ γ , which implies that  f 1 ≥  f 2 . 
Set  α 11 = c / (1 − β) ,  α k, k = c / (1 − β) + (1 − γ)c / β for all  k ∈  {2,  K ̃} , and α k−1, k = c / (1 − β) + (1 − γ)c / β for all  k ∈  {2,…, K ̃} , and set the value of all 
other links to  0 . It can be verified that for these potential gains from trade, that the 
chain network of Figure A2 is stable and overinvestment inefficiency achieves the 
upper bound. Similar examples can be constructed when  β ≤ γ , which implies that 
f 2 ≥  f 1 .
So far, an  oII bound has been found for formed components with  K ̃ matches, and 
it has been shown that this bound is tight. To find the tight  oII bound for any stable 
network that  m buyers and  n sellers might form, the following possibilities need to 
be considered: (i) multiple components being formed; or (ii) a single component 
being formed, but with only a proper subset of the short side of the market matched. 
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However, it will now be shown that for any stable network  m buyers and  n sellers 
could form, the maximum possible level of  oII occurs when there is a single com-
ponent with  K ̃ =  min {m, n} matches—the maximum possible number of matches. 
This is true for any  β ∈ (0, 1) and any  γ ∈ (0, 1) .
If  β > (≥)γ , then  f 1 > (≥) f 2 and
  
∂  K ̃ − 1 _________   f 1 ( K ̃, γ, β) −  K ̃  __________∂ K ̃ > (≥)0. 
If  β < (≤)γ , then  f 2 > (≥) f 1 and
  
∂  K ̃ − 1 _________   f 2 ( K ̃, γ, β) −  K ̃  __________∂ K ̃ > (≥)0. 
Thus,  h( K ̃, γ, β) is weakly increasing in  K ̃ , and the  oII bound for a network 
with  m buyers and  n sellers is highest when there are as many matches as possible: 
K ̃ =  min {m, n} .
Part (iii): As  γ ∈ (0, 1) , the component structure of any nonempty network with 
overinvestment inefficiency must be of the form shown in Figure A2. In any such 
component there exists a seller and a buyer both of whom have no outside trade 
partner. If  β = 1 , then the seller will have a profitable deviation to delete his trade 
link as he contributes toward the cost of its formation but receives none of the gains 
from trade. If  β = 0 , then the buyer will not be willing to form his trade link. The 
unique stable network is the empty network, and there is never any overinvestment.
Part (iv): When ( β ≥  1 _2 and  γ = 0 ) or ( β ≤  1 _2 and  γ = 1 ), there exist poten-
tial gains from trade for which the efficiency loss in all stable networks is  100  per-
cent . This is shown for  β ≤ 1 / 2 and  γ = 1 in Figure A3.
The efficiency loss is  c ______ 2c + 2ε − c → 1 as  ε → 0 . A symmetric example can be 
constructed for  β ≥  1 _2 and  γ = 0 , with the roles of buyers and sellers reversed.
Part (v): Let  β <  1 _2 and  γ = 0 . As  γ = 0 , only sellers can form out-
side option links. By Theorem 1, seller  s j ’s incentives to form an outside option 
link to buyer  b i are given by  β α η( j )j −  _ u η( j ) ≤ β α η( j)j . Thus, the maximum 
s
1
b
1
b
2 b3 b4
s
2
s
3 s4
Figure A2. Component Structure: Four Trade Links
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 incentives to form outside option links can always occur in networks where 
sellers’ outside trade partners do not trade with anyone and  β ( α η( j )j −  _ u η( j ) ) = β α η(j)j . Without loss of generality, therefore, and as sellers will form at most one 
outside option link, inefficiency in network components consisting of two buyers 
and one seller can be considered: If an overinvestment inefficiency bound for all 
stable networks is found in these networks, it will apply to all networks.
Consider then, without loss of generality,59 the network component shown in 
Figure A4. In this network component, in order for there to be any efficiency loss 
due to overinvestment in non-trade links,  s 1 must form links to both  b 1 and  b 2 . To be 
incentivized to do this,  s 1 ’s payoff in the network shown in Figure A3, panel C must 
be greater than his payoff in the efficient network:  ζ + (1 − β)ε − 2c ≥ (1 − β) 
× (ζ + ε) − c . This holds if and only if  ζβ ≥ c . Let  c = ζβ − ξ ,  ξ ≥ 0 , so 
that this constraint is satisfied. For this cost, and for the gains from trade above, 
 oII =  ζβ − ξ________  ζ(1 − β ) + ε + ξ. The efficiency loss in the worst stable network is maxi-
mized by setting  ξ = ε = 0 . Thus, overinvestment inefficiency must be less than 
or equal to  
β ___ 
1 − β for any network with  β <  1 _2 and  γ = 0 . This bound is achieved 
in the above example with  ξ = ε = 0 .
It will now be shown that losses due to underinvestment inefficiency cannot be 
bounded below  100 percent .
LEMMA 3: For exogenous cost shares, all nonempty sets  P ,  Q of buyers and sellers, 
respectively, and for all  β ≠ γ , there exist potential gains from trade  a for which all 
the net gains from trade generated by the efficient network are lost to underinvest-
ment inefficiency in all stable networks. When  β = γ , in contrast, there is no under-
investment inefficiency in any stable network for any potential gains from trade  a .
Suppose  β = γ .60 For any potential gains from trade  a , suppose, toward a con-
tradiction, that a link  l i j is inefficiently underinvested in, in a stable network  L . From 
59 Varying  ε ≥ 0 and  ζ > 0 , this example accounts for all possible two-buyers one-seller networks, for any  c . 
60 A similar condition is found in Caballero and Hammour (1998). 
Panel A. Potential links Panel B. Efficient network Panel C. Stable network
u1 = β(2c + 2ε) – c
b1
s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2
2c + 2ε 2c + ε
b1 b1
2c + 2ε 2c + 2ε 2c + ε
u1 = (1 + β)ε
v1 = (1 − β)(2c + 2ε) v1 = (1 − β)ε v2 = 0
Figure A3. Overinvestment Inefficiency of 100 Percent
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the definition of underinvestment inefficiency,  a ij > c . However, this implies that 
i would benefit from forming this link as  β a ij > γc , and  j would also benefit from 
forming this link as  (1 − β) a ij > (1 − γ)c . Network  L is then not stable, which is 
a contradiction.
Suppose  β ≠ γ . Consider any gains from trade  a with an associated nonempty 
efficient network  L e (a) . Adjust the value of the links in  a as follows (and denote 
these adjusted gains from trade  a ˆ ). For  α = a , find the matching  μ ∗ (α) that max-
imizes the gains from trade. Set  a ̂i μ ∗ (i) ∈  (c, max {γc / β, (1 − γ)c/(1 − β )} ) for 
all  i ∈ P . Finally, set  a ̂ij < c for all other links  (for all j ≠  μ ∗ (i )) . As  β ≠ γ , 
 max {γc / β, (1 − γ)c / (1 − β)} > c . The efficient network is therefore the non-
empty network  L e (a) =  L e (a) .
Suppose link  l i μ ∗ (i) is formed. As it will never be profitable for a buyer and seller 
to form a link that generates less surplus than it costs, this will be  i ’s only link 
and  μ ∗ (i) ’s only link. From Theorem 1 and equation 5, buyer  i ’s payoff will be 
β a ̂i μ ∗ (i) − γc , while seller  μ ∗ (i) ’s payoff will be  (1 − β) a ̂i μ ∗ (i) − (1 − γ)c . It is 
easily verified that if  a i μ ∗ (i) <  max {γc / β, (1 − γ)c / (1 − β)} , either  i or  μ ∗ (i) will 
receive a negative payoff and have a profitable deviation to not invest in  l i μ ∗ (i) . The 
link  l i μ ∗ (i) can then never be formed in a stable network, and the unique stable net-
work is the empty network. ∎
We now show that the empty network satisfies stronger stability requirements 
than pairwise Nash stability. A strong nash equilibrium of a game  G played by 
players  n is a strategy profile σ such that there is no coalition  M ⊆ n and no other 
strategy profile σ′ in which
•	 	 σ ′ i =  σ i for all  i ∉ M ;
• each  i ∈ M strictly prefers σ′ to σ.
ζ ζ
b1
Panel A. Potential links Panel B. Efficient network Panel C. Stable network
b2
s1 s1 s1
ζ + ε ζ + εζ + ε
v1 = (1 − β)(ζ + ε) – c v1 = ζ+(1 − β)(ε) − 2c
u1 = β(ζ + ε) u1 = βε u2 = 0
b1 b2 b1 b2
Figure A4. Bounded Overinvestment Inefficiency
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Note that in a strong Nash equilibrium a buyer  i still chooses which links to invest 
in (his strategy set is still  {0, 1} n ), and his payoff from a formed network is still given 
by equation 5 less his costs of link formation.
COROLLARy 5: For gains from trade  a ˆ defined in the Proof of Lemma 3 and 
γ ≠ β , the unique strong nash equilibrium of the simultaneous link formation 
game is the empty network.
Any network in which a link  l ij ≠  l i μ ∗ (i ) is formed cannot be a strong Nash equi-
librium. As already shown either  i or  j will have an individual profitable deviation 
deleting it. Given this, a network in which link  l i μ ∗ (i ) is formed cannot be a strong 
Nash equilibrium either. As argued above, either  i or  μ ∗ (i) will have an individual 
profitable deviation deleting it. However, the empty network is a strong Nash equi-
librium. Although there are net gains from trade that can be realized by forming 
links  i and  μ ∗ (i ) , all such deviations leave either  i or  μ ∗ (i ) with a negative payoff. As 
agents choose only the set of links to invest in (and not how much to invest), there 
is no way that the agent who receives the negative payoff can be compensated for 
his negative payoff.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Part (i): Suppose that there is underinvestment in link  l ij , so that  a ij > c . Buyer 
i and seller  j will then have a profitable pairwise deviation to form link  l i j and pay 
investment shares  γ i j = β .
Part (ii): This proof is by counterexample. Consider gains from trade  a such that 
if the complete network is formed ( α = a ), buyers  i ∈ P′ ⊆ P will be matched 
and for each  i ∈ P ′ ,  a i μ ∗ (i) = 1 ,  a iη(i) = 1 − ε , and  a kη(i) =  a k μ ∗ (i) = 0 for all 
k ≠ i . Set the value of all other gains from trade to  zero . Let  c =  1 _2 − ε and con-
sider first  β ∈  [0,  1 _2] . The efficient network, consisting of the links  { l iμ(i) } i∈P′ , will 
not be stable for any such  β :  i will increase his share of the surplus from trade with 
μ ∗ (i) by  (1 − β) a i μ ∗ (i) = (1 − β)(1 − ε) , at a cost of  c =  1 _2 − ε , if he forms the 
link to  η(i) . This increases  i ’s net payoff if and only if  (1 − β)(1 − ε) >  1 _2 − ε (equivalently  β < 1 / (2 − 2ε) ≤ 1 / 2) . It is then straightforward to show that in 
the unique stable network,  i pays the entire cost of forming the link  l iη(i ) and pays 
between  1 / 2 − (2 − β )ε and  1 / 2 − ε toward the formation of link  l iμ(i ) . The effi-
ciency loss in the unique stable network is therefore  (0.5 − ε)/(0.5 + ε) , and as 
ε → 0 the efficiency loss goes to  100 percent . To show that the efficiency loss can 
go to  100 percent in all stable networks with  β ∈  [ 1 _2, 1] , relabel  i ∈ P as  j ∈ Q , μ ∗ (i ) as  μ ∗ ( j ) , and  η(i ) as  η( j ) .
PROOF OF COROLLARy 3:
If
  max 
i, j 
  α ij <  max   
 { γ __β c,  1 − γ ____1 − β c} , 
80 AMErIcAn EconoMIc JournAL: MIcroEconoMIcs novEMBEr 2015
then for all  i, j pairs, either  β α ij < γc and  i does not want to form a link to  j or (1 − β ) α i j < (1 − γ)c and  j does not want to form a link to  i . The empty network 
will be stable, and there will be  100 percent underinvestment inefficiency. If instead 
there exist  i and  j such that  β α i j ≥ γc and  (1 − β ) α i j ≥ (1 − γ)c , then the empty 
network cannot be stable:  i and  j will have a profitable deviation by forming a link 
to each other. Together, these conditions imply that there cannot be  100 percent 
underinvestment inefficiency if
  max 
i, j 
  α i j ≥  max   
 { γ __βc,  1 − γ ____1 − βc} . ∎ 
PROOF OF COROLLARy 4:
As before, let  K ̃ =  min {m, n} ,
  f 1 (γ, β,  K ̃) =   ( K ̃ − 1) + 1 − γ  _____________ 1 − β +   ( K 
̃ − 1) (1 − γ)  ____________β , 
  f 2 (γ, β,  K ̃) =   ( K ̃ − 1) + γ  __________β +   ( K 
̃ − 1) γ _______
1 − β . 
By definition,  h(γ, β, m, n) = ( K ̃ − 1)/ (max { f 1 (γ, β,  K ̃) ,  f 2 (γ, β,  K ̃) } −  K ̃) . 
Note that  f 1 (γ, β,  K ̃) is decreasing in  γ , while  f 2 (γ, β,  K ̃) is increasing in  γ , so it 
is when  f 1 (γ, β,  K ̃) =  f 2 (γ, β,  K ̃) that  γ minimizes  max {  f 1 (γ, β,  K ̃) ,  f 2 (γ, β,  K ̃) } (and hence maximizes h(γ, β, m, n)) . Observing that  f 1 (γ, β,  K ̃) =  f 2 (γ, β,  K ̃) when 
γ = β completes the proof. ∎
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